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As recently as in the 1970s, neither the general public nor policy makers were prepared
to listen to those who warned of the damaging eﬀects human behaviour was having upon
the environment. However, evidence that environmnent damaging is occuring as a result of
human behaviour has now become so manifest that there is almost unamnimous scientiﬁc
agreement on the subject. As a result it is generally accepted that humans must react to
reduce negative impact upon the environement
Economics is the human science which studies the allocation of scarce resources. Thus, as
environment is a scarce resource it is logical and necessary that we study the interaction
between the productive sphere and the environment. To produce wealth, we need (among
others) raw materials and energy. In addition, production often -not to say necessarily-
enhances environmental externalities. However, the planet Earth has an ability to recycle,
and thus produce new raw materials and treat waste: this is often referred to as Earth’s
bio-capacity. Problems arise if we overpass this bio-capacity, and it has now occured for two
decades1. ”Over-living”can only be temporary, since we draw in a ﬁnite capital.
As a consequence, it seems both interesting and relevant to study the interaction between the
environment and production. There are several dimensions in the concept of ”production”.
First, there is a socio-economic dimension, i.e. which deals with the organisation of economic
relations. Markets and competition are the usual mechanisms in which economic exchanges
are performed. This gives rise to the analysis of the consequences of the organisation of
economic relations upon the environment. One the one hand, competition stimulates (either
to conquere or to survive) innovation and technological progress, which is -ceteris paribus- ,
1See ”Living Planet Report 2006” at http://www.wwf.org
vii
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a good thing and may result in positive environmental outcomes. On the other hand, since
it stimulates supply and thus production, it also increases the pressure on environment.
Secondly, what is produced is intended to be consumed. Therefore, examining the determi-
nants of consumption is also relevant. In particular, one would like to know if values are
one of these determinants. Changing values might lead to a change in behaviour and then
possibly decrease the pressure on the environment.
Finally, technological progress and innovation are important dimensions of production. More-
over, it can be seen as a way to face the environmental challenge. If this is true, should we
not observe a decrease in the levels of externality? However, it seems that we observe the
contrary, i.e. consumption of resources and pollution (emissions, waste, etc...) both increase.
For many scholars, these are fascinating issues that require further analysis. This thesis
brings contributions to the following issues. In the ﬁrst chapter, we will analyse theoreti-
cally the conﬂicts of interest between environmental and competition policy on oligopolistic
asymmetric markets. In a following chapter, we will study the empirical link between envi-
ronmental policy preferences and energy consumption. Finally, we will analyse the empirical
relationship between income and energy consumption.






A voluntary agreement is one possible tool for dealing with increasingly pressing environmen-
tal challenges. It is an agreement between one authority (e.g the Ministry of Environment
of a given country) and an industry, or some of the ﬁrms acting in a given market. One
advantage of voluntary agreements is the fact that they allow for the undertaking of policies
which take into account the speciﬁc nature of a given industry. In such agreements, ﬁrms
usually have to comply with environmental objectives, in return for economic compensation.
Compensation may occur as either a subsidy to encourage investment in clean technologies,
or a discount in the tax paid in relation to emissions’ levels. An example of this kind of
agreement is the Danish agreement on industrial energy eﬃciency, which is part of a plan
aiming at reducing CO2 emissions1. To do so, the Danish government created incentives in
order to encourage the concerned ﬁrms to behave more environment-friendly: in exchange
of a reduction in CO2 emissions a posteriori, ﬁrms get a discount in the per-unit of emis-
sion tax rate, through an individual contract proposed by the regulator to the ﬁrms. The
concerned ﬁrms (329 in total) are those from energy intensive production processes (e.g.
1See the related OECD report. Refer to the bibliography for more details
1
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paper industry, Iron and steel, milk condensation, etc...) and the authority is the Danish
Energy Agency. I will now focus on the main economic issues. Firstly, each ﬁrm is proposed
an agreement and decides to agree upon it or not. As a consequence, there is no issue of
free-riding here because there is no common objective. Secondly, a lot of controls and au-
dits have been undertaken, before and during the agreement. Thus, the Danish Authority
has received signiﬁcant information about the ﬁrms, especially those contained in the plan
sketched by ﬁrms to decrease their emissions. Thirdly, if a ﬁrm did not comply with what it
had committed to, it simply did not get the tax-rebate, which constitutes a strong incentive.
To ensure that ﬁrms behaved the way they had to, they were regularly required to provide
progress reports, which were later examined for their authenticity. In the case in which a
ﬁrm failed to meet the terms of the contract, the Danish Authority could simply cancel the
agreement. It turned out that this scheme has been eﬀective, although the administrative
costs have been quite high (mainly due to controls and audits). The example of the Danish
leads to the following issues: how heterogeneity among ﬁrms inﬂuences an environmental
policy, through a given tool, namely the voluntary agreement (hence VA); what are the con-
sequences in terms of competition? From a theoretical viewpoint, VAs are interesting since
there are a policy-mix tool2: on the one hand, there is a standard to be met (then, we know
ex-ante the environmental goal reached); on the other hand, there is an economic incentive.
Empirically, VAs have been increasingly used for about 20 years3.
Yet, as far as competition is concerned, VAs create collusion. Brau and Carraro, 1999
survey the literature concerning the relationship between VAs and market structures. The
main results are the following: on the one hand, VAs are likely to increase both the in-
dustry concentration and the likelihood of collusive behaviour; on the other hand, highly
concentrated industries are more likely to favour both the existence of VAs as well as their
eﬀectiveness. Thus, there is a clear dilemma between environmental beneﬁts and economic
costs. In other words, VAs might enhance a decrease in production greater than the socially
optimal one. Here, we plan to explore the consequences of VAs when ﬁrms are heterogeneous.
2Glachant, 1995
3Refer to the report of the OECD 2003
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This will allow us to answer a very simple and practical question such that: should we use
VAs as an environmental tool in homogeneous oligopolies or heterogeneous ones?
Intuitively, one can expect VAs to be used in little heterogeneous industries. However, when
ﬁrms are heterogeneous, it might be a good solution to have an agreement with less ﬁrms.
This is due to the ineﬃciency at stake. In the next section, we describe the game. Then, in
the following sections, we will solve it stage by stage, inducting backward.
1.2 Model Set-up
This section will consist of a description of the framework in which our analysis will be con-
ducted.
1.2.1 Description Of The Game
In this model, there are three agents: a regulator and 2 ﬁrms in oligopolistic competition.
The game played is a three-stage one. In the ﬁrst stage, the regulator -maximising welfare4-
proposes a VA, which is modeled as a ﬁrm-level take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer (d,s), where d is a
subsidy a ﬁrm receives if it does not emit more than s units of emission. In order to avoid
multiple equilibrium issues, we assume that the regulator is able to choose whom to propose
the contract to: either to one of the ﬁrms, either to both of them (in that case they will
be proposed the same contract), or either to none of them. In the second stage, each ﬁrm
decides whether to agree or not upon the proposal of the regulator. In the third stage, ﬁrms
compete ` a la Cournot, each ﬁrm setting its production in order to maximise its proﬁts.
Figure 1- Game Tree
4The welfare function is described in the following subsection
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Where:
• (∅,∅) means that the regulator does not propose any contract to any ﬁrm
• ((d,s),∅) (respectively (∅,(d,s))) means that the regulator proposes a contract (d,s)
only to the ﬁrst ﬁrm (respectively to the second one)
• ((d,s),(d,s) means that the regulator proposes a contract to both ﬁrms
• Y (N) means that a ﬁrm accepts the agreement (refuses)
• D represents the decision subgame
• C represents the competition subgame
I will now turn to both the objectives and the assumptions on the behaviour of both types
of agents.
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1.2.2 Players: Objectives And Behavioural Assumptions
Regulator
The regulator’s objective is to maximize welfare, which consists of the consumer surplus, the
producer surplus (net of tax revenue), and the disutility which occurs due to the externality
damaging the environment. Formally, the objective of the regulator is the following:
max
(d,s)
W = CS + PS − DU(S)
Where:
• S is the total amount of emissions of CO2 in the industry (S =
P2
i=1 si)
• (d,s) is the contract proposed by the authority
• CS is the consumer surplus
• PS is the producer surplus
• DU(S) is the desutility of the externality (DU(S) = eS2))
Firms
The industry is made up of two ﬁrms, competing ` a la Cournot. The constant marginal cost
of the most eﬃcient ﬁrm is set equal to 0, that of the second one equal to ∆. Furthermore,
the emission function is:
∀ i ∈ {1,2}, si(qi) = eqi
Where e represents the emission per unit of production, and is strictly positive. Let us
notice that we assume that each ﬁrm has the same pollution function in order to focus on
the heterogeneity of production costs, which is at the very core of the analysis. In case ﬁrm
i refuses the proposal of the regulator, its proﬁt function is the following:
Πi(qi) = P (Q)qi − ciqi
If it accepts and respects it (eqi ≤ s), its proﬁt function is:
Πi(qi) = P (Q)qi − ciqi + deqi
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Indeed, the proﬁt is made up of the revenue (P (Q)qi), minus the total production cost ,
plus the subsidy5. Finally, we assume a linear demand function, in order to simplify the
calculations.
Formally, we have:
Q(P) = 1 − P
Where:
• P is the price
• Q the global quantity, equal to
P2
i=1 qi.
After having set-up the model, let us now solve it using backward induction and determine
the equilibrium of each of the subgames: ﬁrst the competition subgame; secondly the decision
subgame; ﬁnally the contract subgame.
1.3 Competition Subgame Equilibrium
In this section, we will determine the Nash equilibria of the competition subgame. It should
be noted that there are four diﬀerent cases to be considered: First the case in which both
ﬁrms are proposed the agreement; second the case in which only the ﬁrst one is proposed;
third the case in which only the second one is proposed; fourth the one in which no agreement
is proposed.
1.3.1 Case 1: Both Firms Participate
If both ﬁrms accept the proposal of the regulator, the proﬁt maximisation problem they will









qi − ciqi + deqi
s.t : eqi ≤ s
5Actually, it is a discount in the per-unit tax t. However, ﬁxing the latter to 1 turns d into a subsidy
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We can rewrite this program as follows:










qi − ciqi + deqi + λ
Y Y
i (s − eqi)
where λY Y
i is the Lagrange multiplier of the ﬁrm i associated to the constraint imposed by
the agreement when both ﬁrms agree.
The ﬁrst-order conditions6 of such a problem are, for any i = 1,2:
∂Li(qi,λY Y
i )
∂qi = 0 ⇐⇒ 1 − 2qi − q−i + de − λY Y
1 e = 0
λY Y
i (s − qie) = 0
One can easily observe that there are four cases under consideration, given the fact that we
do not want to restrict the analysis.
Case (i): λY Y
1 = λY Y
2 = 0
In this case, the environmental constraint is not binding for either ﬁrm. Setting both La-









The Nash equilibrium of the competition subgame where both ﬁrms par-







3 ). The payoﬀs associated are: (Π
Y Y,iv
i )i=1,2 = ((1+de+∆
3 )2,(1+de−2∆
3 )2).
Case (ii): λY Y
1 = 0; λY Y
2 > 0
λY Y
1 being equal to 0 implies that q1 < s
e. On the other hand, having λY Y
2 being strictly
greater than 0 implies that q2 > s
e. These two conditions would imply that q2 be greater
than q1. This is clearly impossible as the ﬁrst ﬁrm is more eﬃcient than the second one.
6The reaction functions are sketched in annex
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Case (iii): λY Y
1 > 0; λY Y
2 = 0
In that case, the constraint of the ﬁrst ﬁrm is binding and thus q1 is equal to s
e. Plugging
this value in the FOC of the second ﬁrm and taking into account that λY Y











The Nash equilibrium of the competition where both ﬁrms participate in the






















Case (iv): λY Y
1 > 0; λY Y
2 > 0
In that case, both ﬁrms are constrained and therefore they both produce what the contract
allows them to, i.e. s
e.
The Nash equilibrium of the competition subgame where both ﬁrms partici-


















1.3.2 Case 2: Neither Firm Participates
In this case, ﬁrms will simply maximise the proﬁt of both ﬁrms without any constraint.
Therefore, this case is the one of a simple competition ` a la Cournot, where ﬁrms solve for
the following program:









The FOC amounts to:
1 − 2qi − q−i − ci = 0
The Nash equilibrium of the competition subgame where neither ﬁrm partici-
pates in the agreement is: (q
N,N
i )i=1,2 = (1+∆
3 , 1−2∆
3 ). The payoﬀs associated are:
(Π
N,N
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Let us turn now to the ﬁnal case, namely when only one ﬁrm signs the agreement.
1.3.3 Case 3: Only The Most Eﬃcient Firm Participates
First, it should be noted that the refusal of one ﬁrm to sign the agreement can occur in two
cases since there are two ﬁrms. Thus, solving for one case amounts by analogy to solve for











q1 + deq1 + λ
Y N(s − eq1)
The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
∂L(q1,λY N)
∂q1 = 0 ⇐⇒ 1 − 2q1 − q2 + de − λY Ne = 0
λY N(s − q1e) = 0











1 − 2q2 − q1 − ∆ = 0





1 − 2q1 − q2 − c11 + de − λ
Y,N
1 e = 0
1 − 2q2 − q1 − c2 = 0
Case (i): λY N > 0
In that case, ﬁrm 1 will bind its constraint and thus produce a quantity equal to s
e. The
second ﬁrm has got no constraint since it does not participate in the VA and will respond
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The Nash equilibrium of the competition subgame where the most eﬃcient

























Case (ii): λY N = 0












The Nash equilibrium of the competition subgame where the more eﬃcient

















1.3.4 Case 4: Only Firm 2 Participates
By analogy to the previous case, we have the following equilibria.
The Nash equilibrium of the competition subgame where the less eﬃcient



























The Nash equilibrium of the competition subgame where the less eﬃcient
ﬁrm participates in the agreement is: (q
NY,ii
i )i=1,2 = (1+∆−de
3 , 1−2∆+2de













Having solved for the competition subgame, let us now proceed in reverse order and solve
the decision subgame.
1.4 Decision Subgame
This section will determine the conditions on the terms of the contract in order for the
diﬀerent possible equilibria to be Nash equilibria of the decision subgame. To do so, each of
the four cases will be analysed with speciﬁc focus upon the possible proﬁtable deviations.
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1.4.1 Case 1: Both Firms Participate in the VA







In order to check whether the participation of both ﬁrms is in that case a Nash equilibrium,
we have to check several conditions. First of all, there has to be no proﬁtable deviation for
at least one of the two players, i.e. one having an incentive to move from Y to N. Formally,














1 is the equilibrium quantity produced by ﬁrm 1 if it participates in the agreement;
• BR¯ c
1(qc
2) is the best response of ﬁrm 1 to ﬁrm 2’ decision
We need to determine Π1(BR¯ c
1(qc
2),qc
2). This proﬁt is obtained maximising the following
program:





2 + 2∆ − de
6
Therefore, we can write the previous conditions as:






2 + 2∆ − de
6
2
As the set of parameters is such that (∆,e) ∈ <+ ∗<+∗, this condition always holds. There-
fore, ﬁrm 1 has no incentive to deviate and refuse the agreement. By analogy7, we would
ﬁnd that ﬁrm 2 neither has no incentive to deviate from Y . These conditions are trivial: if
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When both ﬁrms participate and none of them is constrained, {Y,Y } is an Nash
equilibrium of the decision subgame for the whole set of the parameter, i.e.





Let us recall that the second case is not possible and therefore we must deal directly with


















We need to determine the proﬁt if there is deviation from ”Y”, which results from the max-
imisation of the following program:






e + ∆ − de
4
Plugging this value in the proﬁt function, we obtain the following condition:

1 − s








e + ∆ − de
4
2
The second condition to be checked is that the second ﬁrm also has no incentive to deviate.
Firstly, let us compute its best response to ﬁrm 1’s action. We have to solve the following
program:
maxq2Π1 = (1 − q
c



















. The second ﬁrm will not deviate if and only if this proﬁt is




















e − ∆ − de
2
2
Clearly, this condition always holds as e is positive.
What remains to be proved is the monotonicity of the proﬁt function of ﬁrm 1 (i.e. that it
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has no incentive to produce less than s










The condition for this derivative to be positive is q1 being lower than
1+ s
e+∆+de
4 . One can
easily check that it holds for any q1 < s
e.
When both ﬁrms participate and only ﬁrm 1 is constrained, {Y,Y } is a Nash
























e. The best response of ﬁrm 1 to ﬁrm 2’s action is derived from the following program:












































































When both ﬁrms participate and are constrained, {Y,Y } is a Nash equilibrium
of the decision subgame for the following set of values of parameters:{(∆,e)|(1.2)∧
(1.3)}.
1.4.2 Only The Most Eﬃcient Firm Participates
In this case, there are two subcases to be considered, whether qc
1 is or not greater than s
e.
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We need to determine Π1(BR¯ c
1(qc
2),qc
2). This proﬁt is obtained by maximising the following
program:





2 + 2∆ + de
6
Therefore, we can write the previous conditions as:










As the set of parameters is such that (∆,e) ∈ <+ ∗<+∗, this condition always holds. There-
fore, ﬁrm 1 has no incentive to deviate and refuse the agreement. Clearly, there is no issue
of deviation for ﬁrm 2 since it has not been proposed the agreement.
Therefore, {Y,N} -when ﬁrm 1 is not constrained- is an equilibrium of the the
decision subgame for the whole set of parameter, i.e. {(∆,e)|∆ ≥ 0 ∧ e > 0}.
In that case, the condition is trivial since the environmental constraint is relatively low to
prevent ﬁrm 1 to produce what it would produce anyway in the case of a competition ` a la

















We need to determine the proﬁt if there is deviation from ”Y”, which results from the max-
imisation of the following program:
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Plugging this value in the proﬁt function, we obtain the following condition:

1 − s











Here again, there is no issue of deviation for the second ﬁrm as it has not been proposed the
agreement.
{Y,N} -ﬁrm 1 being constrained- is an equilibrium of the decision subgame for














1.4.3 The Second Firm Participates
In that case, there are two subcases to be considered, whether qc




















We need to determine Π1(qc
2,BR¯ c
1(qc
1). This proﬁt is obtained by the maximisation of the
following program:





1 − 2∆ + 1
2de
3
Therefore, we can write the previous conditions as:










As the set of parameters is such that (∆,e) ∈ <+ ∗<+∗, this condition always holds. There-
fore, ﬁrm 2 has no incentive to deviate and refuse the agreement. Clearly, there is no issue
of deviation for ﬁrm 1 since it has not been proposed the agreement.
Consequently, {N,Y } -when ﬁrm 2 is not constrained- is an equilibrium of the
decision subgame for the whole set of parameter, i.e. {(∆,e)|∆ ≥ 0 ∧ e > 0}.
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We need to determine the proﬁt if there is deviation from ”Y”, which results from the max-
imisation of the following program:








Plugging this value in the proﬁt function, we obtain the following condition:

1 − s











Here again, there is no issue of deviation for the second ﬁrm as it not been proposed the
agreement.
In the end, {N,Y } -ﬁrm 2 being constrained- is an equilibrium of the deci-















It is important to recall that the welfare function consists of the consumer surplus, the
producer surplus and the disutility associated with pollution. Moreover, if one takes into
account that the cost of the most eﬃcient ﬁrm has been set to 0, we can write the objective
function of the regulator as follows8:
W(d,s) = Q(1 − (
1
2
+ e)Q) − ∆q2
That expression allows us to clearly see the diﬀerent eﬀects at stake. On the one hand,
one can see that global production has two eﬀects on welfare: it increases it as long as the
8This expression is a simpliﬁed one of W(d,s) =
R Q
0 (1 − u)du − ∆q2 − e(
P2
i=1 qi)2
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total surplus has not reached its maximum; it decreases it because of the desutility due to
the emissions. On the other hand, the direct eﬀect of the production of the second ﬁrm is
without ambiguity negative: this is due to the ineﬃciency of the second ﬁrm that needs more
resources than the ﬁrst one to produce the same amount of goods. However, the production
of the second ﬁrm also has an indirect eﬀect on welfare, via its eﬀects on global production.
What remains to be completed is to determine the best contract for each of the possi-
bilities of participants. Before doing so, we will determine the ﬁrst-best optimal to have a
benchmark situation in mind.
1.5.1 A benchmark case: The First-best optimum
To determine the ﬁrst-best optimum, we have to solve for the following program:
max
(q1≥0,q2≥0)
W(q1,q2) = (q1 + q2)(1 − (
1
2
+ e)(q1 + q2)) − ∆q2
The FOC of such a problem are:
δW(q1+q2)
δq1 = 0 ⇐⇒ 1 − 2(1
2 + e)(q1 + q2) = 0
δW(q1+q2)
δq2 = 0 ⇐⇒ 1 − 2(1
2 + e)(q1 + q2) − ∆ = 0
Clearly, both conditions can not hold simultaneously. If the ﬁrst one holds, then the second
one is negative. In particular, the second derivative is negative for q2 = 0. Thus, the
production of the second ﬁrm is equal to 0 and that of the ﬁrst ﬁrm is equal to 1. Therefore,






One can notice that for e = 0, i.e. there is no externality, the quantity produced will be
equal to 1. Indeed, the cost of the most eﬃcient ﬁrm being equal to 0, the best response is
to produce everything that is possible, i.e. 1.
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1.5.2 Three Particular Cases
No Externality
If there is no externality, i.e. e = 0, the consequences are twofold: ﬁrstly, the regulator
does not care anymore about the environment; secondly, ﬁrms no longer pollute. Therefore,
whatever the contract proposed by the regulator, the competition subgame equilibrium is
that of standard Cournot duopoly. Indeed, when e is equal to 0, the regulator just maximises
the total surplus. Moreover, each ﬁrm maximises the following proﬁt function:
Πi(qi,q−i) = qi(1 − qi − q−i − ci)
One can see that the subsidy does not appear anymore in the proﬁt function and this explains
the response of the ﬁrm to any given contract of the regulator. Yet, the externality does not
appear anymore in the welfare function and as a consequence, the regulator will not propose











In that case, ∆ = 0. The consequence is that the regulator is able to implement a contract
such that the level of welfare is the one of the ﬁrst best: it sets s so as to enhance the ﬁrst
best production and sets d to force ﬁrms’ participation. Indeed, since there is no longer
asymmetry between ﬁrms, there is no issue of eﬃciency and thus only the global production
is relevant. In other words, market share does not matter since each is as eﬃcient as the
other. Therefore, the regulator will allow ﬁrms to produce a quantity Q0 such that the total
amount of emissions does not overtake the optimal level. Then, any contract enhancing any
(q1,q2) such that q1 + q2 = Q0 will be an equilibrium of the contract subgame equilibrium.
Therefore, it will either be (Y,Y ),or(Y,N)or(N,Y ).
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No Asymmetry, Nor Externality
Following the reasoning of the two previous particular cases, we can now look at the case
where both parameters are equal to 0. Clearly, since the there is no externality, there will be
no contract. Moreover, ﬁrms being as eﬃcient as each other, we end up with the standard











1.5.3 Neither Firm Participates
In that case, we just have to compute the level of welfare, plugging in the welfare function





















1.5.4 Both Firms Are Involved In The Agreement
Both Firms Are Constrained
We deal ﬁrst with the case in which both ﬁrms are constrained. Let us recall that the
regulator maximises its welfare function, given that he wants both ﬁrms to agree upon the
proposal, which amounts to the following program to be solved9:

       
       
max(d≥0,s≥0) W(d,s) = 2s
e (1 − (1
2 + e)2s































Noticing that the three constraints leads to d being large enough, we can just maximise
with respect to s and then ﬁnd d such that all the constraints are satisﬁed. The ﬁrst-order
9Having plugged in the values of the quantities obtained from the competition subgame
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+ e) = 0
Therefore, we obtain:
sY Y,i,∗ = 2−∆
8( 1
2+e)





As far as d is concerned, the optimal value is not that important since it is only a transfer
between the regulator and the ﬁrms. The important point to ensure is that a value of d
exists such that both will participate and this has already been shown. Note otherwise that
the optimal value of s is positive for the whole set of values of parameters.
None Is Constrained
In that case, the regulator solve for the following program:

       
       
max(d≥0,s≥0) W(d,s) = 2+2de−∆
3 (1 − (1
2 + e)2+2de−∆




























We see that whatever the values of the parameter, ﬁrms will participate for any d ≥ 0.
Moreover, for any d, the regulator will set s such that ﬁrms are not constrained. Taking the
derivative of the welfare function and setting it equal to 0, we ﬁnd the following optimal
value of d and the optimal value of welfare:
dY Y,iv,∗ = (
3(2−∆)
4( 1
2+e) − (2 − ∆))1
2
W Y Y,iv,∗ = 2−∆
4( 1
2+e)(2+∆





Note that d has to be greater or equal than 0. This holds only if e < 1
4. Otherwise, the
optimal d is 0, and the level of welfare is the one of the case in which there is no agreement.
Only The Most Eﬃcient Firm Is Constrained
This case has no analytic solution, and we will solve it numerically while solving the whole
game in the next section. We will turn directly to the next case, where only the most eﬃcient
ﬁrm is proposed the agreement.
Meunier, Laurent (2008),Theoretical and Econometric Analysis of Behaviours Toward Environment
European University Institute
DOI: 10.2870/13651.5. OPTIMAL CONTRACT 21
1.5.5 Only The Most Eﬃcient Firm Partipates
The Most Eﬃcient Firm Is Constrained
The problem to be solved by the regulator is:
max(d≥0,s≥0) W(d,s) = (
1+ s
e−2∆






















Here again, a quick look at the constraints reveals that d has to be suﬃciently high. There-
fore, we just have to ﬁnd the optimal value of s. The ﬁrst-order condition is:
∂W(s)
∂s







) + ∆ = 0
In the end, we have the following optimal value of the maximum level of emissions and
welfare when the ﬁrst ﬁrm participates and is constrained:
sY N,ii,∗ = 1+∆
1
2+e − (1 − 2∆)
W Y N,ii,∗ = ( 1+∆
2( 1
2+e))(1 − (1
2 + e)( 1+∆
2( 1
2+e))) − ∆((1 − 2∆) − 1+∆
2( 1
2+e))
One can observe that sY,N∗ is increasing with respect to the gap in costs and decreasing




2+e)+1. This condition is restrains the set of parameter if and only if e > 1
2.
The most eﬃcient ﬁrm is not constrained
The problem to be solved by the regulator is:
max(d≥0,s≥0) W(d,s) = (2+de−∆
3 )(1 − (1
2 + e)(2+de−∆

















Here again, a quick look at the constraints reveals that d just needs to be positive to ensure
the participation of the ﬁrst ﬁrm. Moreover, for any given value of d, the regulator can set
afterward a value of s such that the ﬁrm 1 is not constrained. Thus, we have to ﬁnd the
optimal value of d, and the ﬁrst-order condition is:
∂W(d)
∂d




2 + de − ∆
3
) + ∆ = 0
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In the end, we have the following optimal value of subsidy and welfare when the ﬁrst ﬁrm




2+e) − (2 − ∆)
W Y N,ii,∗ = ( 1+∆
2( 1
2+e))(1+∆
2 ) − ∆(1 − ∆)




2+e)+3. This condition restrains the set of parameters if
and only if 1
4 < e < 1. If e is lower than one fourth, then this condition is not restraining
since ∆ just needs to be greater than something negative. On the contrary, if e is above 1,
then the optimal d is equal to 0 and the optimal level of welfare is the one obtained in the
case inn which there is agreement at all.
1.5.6 Only The Second Firm Participates
Firm 2 is constrained




W NY,ii,∗ = ( 1−2∆
2( 1
2+e))(1 − (1





Interestingly, one can notice that the optimal quantity determined by the contract will not
be 0 (apart from an improbable combination of the values of parameters). This is due to
the competition at stake: in case the second ﬁrm would produce a 0 quantity, the ﬁrst one
would respond by producing the monopoly quantity(QM). This would be optimal only for e
being such that QFB = QM. In my opinion, that is one highly important illustration of the
fact that an environmental policy can not be conducted independently of the competition
operating within a given market.
Firm 2 is not constrained
The problem to be solved by the regulator is:
max(d≥0,s≥0) W(d,s) = (2+de−∆
3 )(1 − (1
2 + e)(2+de−∆
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Here again, an introductory analysis of the constraints reveals that d just needs to be positive
to ensure the participation of the second ﬁrm. Moreover, for any given value of d, the
regulator can set afterward a value of s such that the ﬁrm 1 is not constrained. Thus, we
have to ﬁnd the optimal value of d, and the ﬁrst-order condition is:
∂W(d)
∂d




2 + de − ∆
3
) + ∆ = 0
In the end, we have the following optimal value of subsidy and welfare when the ﬁrst ﬁrm




2+e) − (2 − ∆)
W NY,ii,∗ = ( 1+∆
2( 1
2+e))(1+∆
2 ) − ∆(1 − ∆)




2+e)−3. This condition tells us that ∆ has to be greater
than 1 in order for d to be positive. This is impossible since ∆ can not10 be greater than
1
2. So, the optimal d is equal to 0 and thus we go back to the situation in which there is no
agreement. Therefore, the regulator can never perform better than in the case of Cournot
competition by proposing an agreement to the second ﬁrm without any constraint. Such a
policy amounts to subsidising the less eﬃcient ﬁrm, and that is why it is not worth doing it.
1.6 Numerical Solution of the Model
1.6.1 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we will determine the best policy that the regulator can perform. Since there
is no analytic solution (because of the case in which both ﬁrms participate and the most
eﬃcient is constrained), we will solve for the model numerically.
The argument proceeds in the following way. For any value of the parameters (i.e. e and
∆), the set of values of the arguments satisfying the diﬀerent constraints as deﬁned in the
previous section may be determined. Subsequently, for each couple (d,s) satisfying the con-
straints, the corresponding level of welfare is computed. This allows us to determine the
10If it were to be the case, then ﬁrm 2 would not be able to produce a positive quantity when competing
` a la Cournot with ﬁrm 1
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values of d and s 11 such that welfare is maximised for each type of contract. Finally, in
order to determine, for each couple of values of the parameters, the best contract that can
be implemented by the regulator, the levels of welfare are compared.
Let us ﬁrst emphasize two things: ﬁrst, a regulator is always able to make at least as well
as if there were no contract; secondly, as the second ﬁrm is less eﬃcient, it is always possi-
ble to implement a contract where only the more eﬃcient ﬁrm is involved and performs at
least as well as if only the second ﬁrm participates. Consequently, in order to determine the
best contract, we just need to compare the level of welfare in the case in which both ﬁrms
participate and the level obtained when only the most eﬃcient ﬁrm participates.
The results of the numerical resolution of the model are sum-up in ﬁgure 2.
Figure 2- Results
Several conclusions may be drawn from the above graph. If there is no externality (i.e.
e = 0), then the level of welfare is that of standard Cournot duopoly, regardless of the
11Refer to the appendix in which s∗(∆) has been sketched for several values of the parameter e. Notice
however that given the constraints and the function, there is no continuity in the function s∗(∆) since a
small change of the value of a parameter can enhance a switch due to a diﬀerent equilibrium.
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contract if there is even any. Indeed, if there is no externality, the subsidy would be equal
to 0. Therefore, ﬁrms would behave as if no contract exists and thus produce the Cournot
equilibrium quantity. Moreover, the possible subsidy being a transfer, it would have no
eﬀect on welfare. Therefore, the equilibrium is that of Cournot with no externality along
the horizontal axis. In particular, if there is no asymmetry (i.e. ∆ = 0), then the outcome
of our game is that of Cournot duopoly with no assymmetry. Let us now turn to the case
in which there is no asymmetry, but there are externalities (i.e. e > 0). In such a case,
the regulator can involve both ﬁrms in an agreement which requires that they produce in
such a way that the enhanced level of emissions is obtained at the ﬁrst-best optimum. In
this particular case, the regulator can choose to require that one ﬁrm produces more than
another: since the latter are perfectly symmetric in all aspects, quantities and thus welfare
will be equal to the one when both produce the same amount of good. Concerning the subset
of parameters in which ∆ > 0 and e > 0, the conclusions are diﬀerent. Indeed, in such a
case, an agreement involving only the most eﬃcient ﬁrm will be the best to be implemented.
Although it appears a little extreme as a result, it will be shown that it is not that surprising.
It is necessary to remember that the per-unit emission is the same for both ﬁrm. It should
also be taken into consideration that ﬁrm 1 is more eﬃcient. Consider the case in which
an agreement leads to a global number of unit of production equal to, Q1, and individual
production equal to q1 and q2. If the regulator implements an agreement where only the
ﬁrst ﬁrm participates, then she can ﬁnd an agreement in which the global production will be
equal to Q1, thus the level of production is the same as in the case of two ﬁrms participating.
However, since the production of ﬁrm 1 will be greater than q1 -and thus that the production
the second ﬁrm will be lower than q2, the total cost of production will necessarily be lower
than in the previous case (remember that ∆ > 0). That is why it is always better, when
both parameters are stricly positive, to have an agreement involving only the most eﬃcient
ﬁrm.
Even if it can appear somehow obvious, notice ﬁrst that it is not obvious that an agree-
ment necessarily reaches an equilibrium a priori. In other words, this result was expected,
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but given the complexity of the constraints, it was necessary to check that the equilibria
were eﬀectively equilibria.
1.6.2 Competition And Economic Policy Issues
Economic Policy
This section we will study the implications in terms of competition issues. It ﬁrst describes
the trade-oﬀ at stake, and then proceeds to analyse the consumer surplus with and without
agreement.
Let us ﬁrst underline the two main conﬂicts of interest at stake between the action of the
regulator and competition: ﬁrstly, involving the most eﬃcient ﬁrm in an agreement strength-
ens its dominant position on the market; secondly, involving both of them in an agreement is
de facto collusive in the sense that the equilibrium is more symmetric. Clearly, this second
remark is due to the nature of the contract proposed by the regulator (recall that there is
no discrimination in terms of allowed levels of emissions). Therefore, we see that the imple-
mentation of an agreement in our model raises competition issues: either strengthening the
dominant ﬁrm’s position; or resulting in a more collusive equilibrium, having in addition a
less eﬃcient ﬁrm producing.
Consumer Surplus
I will now turn to the analysis of consumer surplus. The following graphs represents, for
given values of externality, the diﬀerence in consumer surplus when there is an agreement
and when there is no agreement as a function of asymmetry between ﬁrms.
Figure 3- Diﬀerences in Consumer Surplus
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Let us ﬁrst remark that the graphs represent the diﬀerence in consumer surplus in the case
of a VA and in absence of VA. Therefore, if the diﬀerence is positive, it means that the
consumer surplus in the case of a VA is greater than in case there is no VA.
As one may observe in the ﬁrst graph, when the per-unit emission e is low, the consumer
surplus obtained with a VA is greater than the one obtained under standard Cournot compe-
tition. This holds whatever the value of ∆. Thus, if the objective of a competition authority
is to maximise the consumer surplus, then there is no conﬂict of interest between competition
policy on the one hand, and environmental policy on the other. In other words, damages due
to the externality (generating a loss of welfare) are not great enough to compensate for the
gain in welfare due to an increase in production enhanced by the agreement. (Recall that
in the standard Cournot duopoly model, a regulator would like to subsidise ﬁrms to make
them produce at their marginal cost.)
The second graph exhibits a diﬀerent result: we take an intermediate value of e and the
consumer surplus when there is a VA is greater than the consumer surplus when there is
no VA only if the level of assymmetry between ﬁrms is high enough. When externality is
higher, so is the loss related to it for a given level of production. However, involving the
most eﬃcient ﬁrm in an agreement merits completion for high values of ∆ since production of
ﬁrm 2 induces a high level of ineﬃciency. Therefore, competition and environmental policy
are in conﬂicts when there is little assymmetry between ﬁrms. This is not surprising: when
assymmetry is high, then it is worth subsidising ﬁrm 1 to reduce productive ineﬃciency, and
this outweighs the loss of welfare due to the externality if the ineﬃciency is suﬃciently large.
These most recent results conﬁrm the previous results: when externality is relatively high,
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then competition and environmental policy exist in conﬂict. Indeed, the diﬀerence in con-
sumer surplus is negative regardless of the value of ∆. This means that it is better in
competition policy terms not to implement an agreement. The reason is that the externality
pulls production downward in the case of an agreement (since e is relatively high and the
constraint in the agreement is s
e).
Concerning the question raised in the introduction, it may be concluded that VAs will not
raise competition issues as long as the externality is relatively low.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the implementation of VAs (take-it-or-leave-it-oﬀers in our
model) from an authority aiming at regulating a polluting oligopolistic industry. In this
industry, two ﬁrms compete ` a la Cournot and produce a good enhancing emissions of a
pollutant. The regulator wants to limit these emissions and thus proposes to them (or to
one of them) a contract. If the latter is accepted and respected, ﬁrms get a discount on the
per-emission tax. The main feature of the industry is that the ﬁrms are heterogeneous as
concerns their cost. As a consequence, an agreement involving both ﬁrms, since it is the
same for both of them, enhances loss due to productive ineﬃciency. When an externality
exists , then it is better to propose a contract only to the most eﬃcient ﬁrm.
We have seen that, in terms of competition policy, the role of eﬃciency is very important
and raises risks of abuse of dominance since it increases the dominance of the most eﬃcient
ﬁrm.
Moreover, as concerns consumer surplus, the chapter has shown that a conﬂict of interest
between competition and environmental policy occurs, especially when the externality is high.
In economic policy terms, these results would suggest that in highly polluting oligopolistic
industries, regulation is likely to be better than competition. This is a partial answer to
the question asked in the general introduction, concerning the link between competition and
environment. The other part of the question could be investigated by looking at the positive
eﬀect of competition on environment, either through eﬃciency gains or preferences changes.
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Environmental Policy Preferences vs
Behaviours
2.1 Introduction
Environmental issues concern an increasing number of people, and this might ﬁrst enhance
a change in their preferences and eventually, a possible change in their behaviour. Indeed, it
might be the case that people who feel concerned about the environment are likely to care
more about it than others. In particular, they might want to limit their environmental cost
(henceforth footprint), and thus reduce their consumption of goods that enhance externali-
ties. Investigating the possible existence of a link between what people declare to care about
and their consumption behaviour is the purpose of this chapter.
There are many ways to investigate how people feel concerned by environmental issues,
and how they actually behave. One method of analysing this relationship is to explore the
willingness-to-pay (hence WTP) to protect the environment. Usually, people are asked gen-
eral questions about what they would pay to protect the environment. For example, in the
World Values Survey, people are asked: ”Would you accept an increase in tax to protect
the environment?”. From that survey, Torgler and Garcia-Valinas (2005), studying
the environmental preferences in Spain, created a model to explain the WTP with a set of
socio-economic and demographic variables. One problem usually mentioned concerning the
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WTP is that the content of such survey is of such a vague nature that it is hard for people to
give an accurate answer. Returning to the question asked in the World Values Survey, one
could of course ask how the respondents understood the level of the increase in tax contained
in the question. Moreover, Bulte and al, 2004 have found some evidence that the cause
of environmental damages aﬀects the WTP. From a ﬁeld study, they found in particular
that people are more willing to pay when problems are believed to be human-related. From
the same survey, we know that socio-demographic variables are highly correlated with both
environmental preferences and behaviors(see Duroy (2003)). In this paper, we want to go
a step further and look at the link between environmental policy preferences (i.e. regardless
whether or not a person would prefer a government aiming at protecting the environment
rather than a government aiming at maintaining the current standards of living and be-
haviours.
This issue deserves to be investigated. In order to give an answer, this chapter will compare
environmental policy preferences (i.e. what should the government’s priority be? maintain-
ing the standards of living or protecting the environment) of people and their ecological
footprint. In particular, we will look at what people think about environmental policy and
their consumption of energy. The latter is certainly one formidable environmental challenge:
there are some issues of emissions (in particular greenhouse gas emissions) 1 and fantastic is-
sues of resources depletion (in particular concerning fossil energy). In the British Household
Panel Survey, we have information on both values and consumption. Therefore, it seems ad-
equate to investigate the link between both. The next section will present the determinants
of domestic energy consumption. After this section the chapter will describe the data and
the model to be estimated. In a following section, the results are presented and discussed.
Finally, the last section concludes and suggests some paths for further research.
1see the EU Environmental Report 2003
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2.2 Determinants of Energy Consumption
This section aims at describing the theoretical determinants of household energy consump-
tion. Firstly, it shows that energy consumption is mainly linked to physical and socio-
economic determinants. Secondly, the chapter shows why environmental policy preferences
might be related to energy consumption and as a consequence, how these preferences can
explain part of the diﬀerences in energy consumption among households.
2.2.1 Physical and Socio-economic Determinants
Physical and Environmental Constraints
Clearly, domestic energy consumption crucially depends on physical variables. Among these,
the main one is the weather. Indeed, the energy consumed for heating one’s house crucially
depends on temperatures: the higher the temperatures, the lower the energy consumption.
This holds of course for reasonable temperatures. Clearly, if temperatures are very high,
then people will start to use air-conditioning, which consumes energy. However, we will use
data from the ﬁrst half of the nineties and relative to the UK. This mitigates the possible
”air-conditioning”eﬀect.
Besides temperatures, there are other physical variables that make energy consumption
varying across individuals. Firstly, the size of accommodation plays a clear role in household
energy consumption, especially in relation to heating. Indeed, one can expect that the greater
the size of the accommodation, the greater the need for heating. In the same way, the type
of accommodation should matter theoretically: households living in apartments or terraced-
or semi-detached housing are expected to heat less than people living in houses.
Thirdly, the number and the type of domestic appliances should also matter as concerns
energy consumption. A household that uses any possible domestic appliance is expected to
consume more energy than a household that, for example, just uses a fridge.
Lastly, the type of heating is a crucial determinant of energy consumption. Indeed, there
are diﬀerences in both prices and eﬃciency among diﬀerent types of energy (namely oil, gas,
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electricity and solid fuel or other fuel).
Socio-economic Variables
Besides the physical determinants, there are also some socio-economic determinants.
First of all, income plays a clear role in the energy consumption (see Blundell (1989) and
Redhanz (2005). We will take the log of the annual income and expect the coeﬃcient to
be positive.
Besides houshold income, the relationship of the houshold to the ownership of the property
is a priori crucial in determining the energy consumption of households. Indeed, it is easier
for owners than tenants to invest in better insulation, purchase more eﬃcient durable goods
such as washing-machine, tumble dryer, etc...Consequently, we expect tenants to consume
more energy and to heat their accommodation more than owners do.
We will also examine the age of people even though the eﬀect is not clear a priori.
Another important variable is the number of children in the household. Indeed, a household
where there are many children is expected to heat more in the sense that it might have to
heat a greater number of rooms. Moreover, the probability that there somebody is almost all
the time in a given accommodation is much higher for households where there are children.
Finally, a higher number of children increases the probability of having young children and
thus the necessity to heat more to oﬀer the child good living conditions. To sum up, we
expect the number of children to inﬂuence positively energy consumption.
Finally, another determinant of energy consumption deserves to be taken into account: the
status of people. Pensioners, unemployed people, self-employed people can reasonably be ex-
pected to be heat more since that they are likely to spend more time in their accommodation.
After having described the physical and socio-economic variables, we will now explain why
environmental policy preferences might play a role in explaining part of the observed het-
erogeneity among households as concerns their energy consumption.
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2.2.2 Environmental Policy Preferences and Their Link With En-
ergy Consumption
Economic Policy Issues
The main reason for studying the relationship between the environmental policy preferences
and the actual behaviour of people is related to economic policy implementation. If the pro-
tection of the environment is an important objective of a given government, there are many
ways to act aiming at reaching such a goal. First, there are economic incentives: taxation for
example is one way to increase the price of a good, in our case energy. This is supposed to
make people consume less energy following the increase in prices. Conversely, subsidies can
be used to promote more eﬃcient use of energy. An alternative way is coercion: a regulator
can simply prohibit the use or production of a given good, considered as dangerous. An
example of this kind of prohibition occurred with chemicals such as DDT. A less radical way
to implement environmental policies is to set some norms, for example on emissions. An ex-
ample of such a regulation is to set the level of emission of new vehicles at 120gCO2.km−1 by
2012. A third way is to inform or educate people in order for them to understand better the
complex relationship between their behaviour and the related environmental impact. The
best policy might be a mix of those mentioned obove, but the one that is interesting for this
analysis is the third one. Indeed, if a link exists between what people think and what people
do, then implementing a policy aiming at informing people and consequently changing their
attitudes towards energy use might be worth being performed. As a consequence, if a part
of the heterogeneity of energy consumption may be explained by the heterogeneity in envi-
ronmental policy preferences, then a policy aiming at inﬂuencing those preferences might be
considered for implementation.2
After having described the motivations of our analysis, we will study the theoretical foun-
dations of the existence of a relationship between the environmental policy preferences and
the actual behaviour of people.
2Clearly, this paper is a ﬁrst step. A proper causality analysis should then be performed.
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Theoretical Foundations
The following postulate is at the core of the theoretical foundations: the more people are
aware of a negative externality, the more they will try to decrease their consumption of
externality-enhancing goods. Note that the awareness of the externality can enter in two
ways in the utility function: by simple altruism, people might consume less of a given good;
alternatively, people will be willing to decrease their consumption if they begin to pay the
price of the externality associated to the good. In any case, a given person will be aware if
it arms at least somebody in a suﬃcient extent. In a way, the awareness of the externality
allows its ”internalisation”. What we need to assume at that point is that environmental
policy preferences are a useful measure of the awareness of people concerning environmental
issues. In particular, it can be taken as a measure of their awareness of the negative exter-
nality enhanced by the consumption of a given good. In our case, this would simply mean
that people declaring to be sensitive to the state of environment knows that producing and
consuming energy deplete resources and generate emissions of greenhouse gas(mainly (CO2)
or nuclear waste3. As a consequence, self-declared green people are expected to consume less
energy.
The main reasons for which people have a diﬀerent awareness of environmental concerns can
be the following ones:
• information asymmetry
• idiosyncratic heterogeneity in sensitivity toward environment
• cultural capital heterogeneity
Having observed these theoretical foundations of the analysis, the following section will
describe the data used and the model to be estimated.
3We clearly assume that energy consuming is environmental damaging. This seems reasonable given the
small share of renewable energies, i.e. about 6.3% in average in the EU-25 in 2004, European Environment
Agency.
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2.3 Data and Model
2.3.1 Data set and frame of analysis
To conduct our research, we have used the British Household Panel Survey. This survey has
been conducted annually since 1991 and its gives detailed information about a broad range
of both economic and social variables of British households. This chapter uses 3 waves of
the panel, namely the ﬁrst, the third and the ﬁfth. These three particular waves have been
chosen because information related to environmental policy preferences was available only
in these latter cases. In particular, we know if people would prefer a government aiming
at protecting the environment or rather maintaining the standards of living. The actual
question in the survey is:
”If the government had to choose between maintaining living standards and protecting the





Information about values and environmental policy preferences, life conditions and consump-
tion is available4. On the one hand, we know how much households spend in energy, how
many domestic appliances they own, the type of accommodation, income, the number of
children, etc...5. On the other hand, we have some information about values of people. In
my opinion, this data is highly valuable because we have on the one hand data related to
the values toward environment; on the other hand, we have information on what households
4See http:
www.eds.uk
5We will review completely the variables used in the next subsection.
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consume, i.e. and how they behave. This will allow us to investigate -partly at least- the
already mentioned link.
Concerning temperatures, the chapter uses regional monthly temperature from Weatherbase
data set.
Finally, the Retail Price Index is used to compute both income and energy spendings in
1993-pounds. Note that we have used two type of price index: one for income (the global
consumption price index); one for energy prices. Note that both case use the average annual
growth rate. The data used is from the (UK) Oﬃce for National Statistics (see Economic
Trends 626, January 2006).
2.3.2 Variables
This section deﬁnes a set of variables that have to be taken into account in order to explain
heterogeneity in energy consumption. People in the panel were asked precise questions about
their consumption and what they own, and above all about their energy consumption. This
question is of primary interest for us.
Its importance is due to the fact that energy issues encompass several dimensions of environ-
mental concerns, namely resource depletion and pollution. In Europe, energy use is a major
contributor to greenhouse gas emissions. 6. Otherwise, the last report of the WWF ”Living
Planet 2006” indicates that energy accounts for an important part of the global ecological
footprint.
The available information concerning energy consumption is the monthly fuel expenditures
of households, i.e. the bills of oil, gas and electricity. This energy consumption is our mea-
sure of households’s footprint. The underlying idea is that, taking into account a broad
range of demographic variables, the higher the energy expenditures, the less environmental
friendly the behaviour. Clearly, this is far from perfect nor complete, but it oﬀers an impor-
tant dimension of environment damage for the reasons mentioned above. Moreover, there
is a clear incentive to decrease one’s energy expenditures for economic reasons. This means
6See the report of the EEA ”The EU Environment Report 2003”
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that people who pay attention not to use too much energy might do so in order to save on
money rather than to protect the environment. Clearly, this is a limitation of the empirical
investigation.
We regress the households’ monthly energy spendings on a set of socio-economic and physical
variables, and check the signiﬁcance of the already deﬁned intentional variable. The follow-
ing section takes diﬀerent sets of regressors into account. Inspired in particular by what used
Redhanz (2005) - see also Baker and Blundell (1989)-, I have taken into account
a set of demographic, socio-economic variables, and also some physical variables comply-
ing as much as possible with the theoretical determinants of energy consumption previously
deﬁned. The variables are described in annex 2, table 1.
2.3.3 Model to be estimated
Following the description of the independent variables, it still remains to describe the depen-
dant variable. As mentioned above, the monthly energy spendings of the household will be
taken as a dependant variable or rather the log of it(y). This variable takes into account the
expenditures of all types of fuel for the house (i.e. heating, lighting and domestic appliances
using). Clearly, this is only one dimension of the total footprint of a household. Ideally,
we would like to have information on all types of consumption and emissions. However, as
already mentioned, energy accounts for a large part of one’s ecological footprint. The fuel
bill is therefore a good proxy for the household’s ecological footprint. The underlying idea
is that, taking into account economic and physical variables, people who use more fuel cost
more in environmental terms.
The equation to be estimated is:
yi = βxi + αenvi + ui (2.1)
Where:
• yi is the log of the fuel bill
• xi is the set of socio-economic and physical variables, plus time dummies
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• env is the political preferences variable
• ui is N(0,σ2) distributed
One simple way to know if environmental policy preferences can explain a part of hetero-
geneity in energy consumption is to estimate this equation and then test the signiﬁcance of
the coeﬃcient α. That is the purpose of the next section.
2.3.4 Econometric Issues
The Issue of Prices
Prices in general can vary in several dimensions: ﬁrst, prices vary in location; secondly, prices
vary in time; thirdly, in the case of energy consumption, prices vary by type of energy; ﬁnally,
prices can vary by type of contract.
We know already know that we control for the type of energy. Moreover, taking into account
temperatures allows us to control the inﬂuence of the location. Indeed, it should be recalled
that the analysis uses regional temperature. Furthermore, time is control by taking inﬂation
into account. The only assumption which is made is that households are rational and choose
the best contract. In so doing, possible variations in prices are taken into consideration.
Endogeneity
One could raise some endogeneity concerns in the model. In particular, one could think
that the causality link between environment policy preferences and energy consumption is
valid in both senses. In particular, there could be a causality link from energy spending to
environmental policy preferences. If it was the case, then our estimates would be biased and
thus not reliable. However, in my opinion, this link is not obvious: I do not see any reason
why people who spend more in energy should consequently be less ( or more) environmental
friendly, especially in such a reduced amount of time.
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2.4 Results
The equation (2.1) will be estimated in several ways. First, the equation is estimated pooling
the data of the three waves. Then, we run the regressions separately for each year. Sub-
sequently, we estimate the model using panel data analysis. Finally, we perform the same
regressions, discriminating by type of central heating.
2.4.1 Pooled Regression
As already mentioned, three diﬀerent waves are available in the BHPS in which there is
the environmental policy preference variable. Table 3.1 exhibits the result of such a pooled
regression (9967 observations), using robust OLS. One can notice that apart from the year of
birth of the household reference person and time dummies, all the regressors are signiﬁcantly
-and in the right sense- correlated with the dependent variable. The temperature and the type
of accommodation are negatively correlated: people living in hotter areas and living in ﬂats
or terraced houses spend less on heating. Clearly, households that pay a rent including some
heating and lighting costs spend then less on heating. As we already said, the interpretation
of the coeﬃcients concerning the type of heating is hard to interpret since it controls for
both prices and eﬃciency. However, this is not important: what is important is that the
type of fuel is taken into consideration. Otherwise, one can see that all the other variables
are signiﬁcantly and positively correlated with the fuel bill. Indeed, households consume
more energy as the number of children, the size of their accommodation, their income, and
the number of appliances increase. Moreover, those renting accommodation spend more than
those living in their own property. When one of the partners7 stays at home, it increases
signiﬁcantly the level of household income spent on energy. More interestingly, environment
policy preferences are negatively and signiﬁcantlycorrelated with energy spendings at a 95%
level. Indeed, households, the reference person of which declared that the government should
give priority to the protection of the environment consume in average 2.4% less than other
households.
7Or the only person the household is made up of in the case in which the number of a single person.
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These ﬁrst results would conﬁrm empirically the theoretical existence of a link between the
environmental policy preferences of people and their energy consumption. The next step is
to investigate the question by running separate regression to study better the evolution in
time of the eﬀectiveness of preferences.
2.4.2 Separate regressions by wave
From table 3.3, several conclusions can be drawn. First, we see that the model of energy
consumption is rather stable and robust across the three diﬀerent years considered (i.e. 1991,
1993, and 1995). Indeed, the results obtained are similar to the previous -in terms of sign
and signiﬁcance- as far as physical and socio-economic variables are concerned. However,
environmental policy preferences do not exhibit the same signiﬁcance across years. In the
ﬁrst wave, the latter, though negatively correlated, are not signiﬁcantly correlated. The value
of the t-statistic is equal to −0.74. Thus, the hypothesis according to which the coeﬃcient
α is equal to 0 for the ﬁrst wave can not be rejected. As concerns the second wave, the
environment political preferences turned out not be signiﬁcant neither, though the t-statistic
is equal to −1.34. The nullity of the coeﬃcient α is accepted for the second wave too.
Notice that the coeﬃcient is negative. As far as the third wave is concerned, we do not
accept anymore the nullity of α, since the t-test is equal to −2.44. We can interpret this
result in the following way: the eﬀectiveness of environmental policy preferences is growing
over time. This might mean that time is necessary for people to translate their political
preferences into actions. Assuming that the awareness of environmental concerns is growing
over time, this eﬀectiveness might become stronger and stronger over time. These results
seem to conﬁrm the existence of a correlation between environmental policy preferences and
energy consumption.
One limitation of a pooled regression is that individuals observed in several years are not
considered to be the same across these years. Therefore, some individual eﬀect might not be
taken into account. Consequently, the estimates might be biased and it is therefore necessary
to turn to panel analysis.
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2.4.3 Panel Analysis
In order to take into account individual eﬀects, we regress the same equation (2.1), using a
GLS random-eﬀect panel model estimation. It is ﬁrst performed on the balanced panel, and
then on the unbalanced panel. Equation (2.1) may be rewritten in the following way:
yi,t = βxi,t + αenvi,t + ui,t (2.2)
Where:
• yi,t is the log of the fuel bill of individual i at year t
• xi,t is the set of socio-economic and physical variables of individual i at year t, plus
time dummies
• envi,t is the political preferences of individual i at time t
• ui,t is N(0,σ2) distributed
The crucial assumption of the model considered is that the individual eﬀect is random across
years, i.e. ui,t is iid across time for a given individual. This is a standard assumption when
one deals with individuals: it seems rather logical to consider that the idiosyncratic part of
the heterogeneity among individuals is random rather than ﬁxed over time. That is why we
use a random-eﬀect model random instead of a ﬁxed-eﬀect model. However, there could be
some correlation between independent variables and residuals. We check this assumption by
a Hausman’speciﬁcation test.
Table 3.2 exhibits the results of the regression considered. One can see that apart from the
year of birth, all our regressors are signiﬁcant -most of them at a 1% level-, and correlated
in the expected way. Interestingly, the coeﬃcient α is signiﬁcantly negatively correlated to
the fuel bill, though at a 10% level. People declaring that the priority of the government
should be to protect the environment spend 2.3% less than those who do not make the same
declaration.
This panel analysis therefore allows the conclusion that environmenatal politicy preferences
matter and explain some of the heterogeneity in energy consumption amongst households.
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It is an interesting result because the previous results still hold, having taken into account
individual eﬀects.
Considering the unbalanced panel, table 7 exhibits diﬀerent results. As far as demographic
variables are concerned, the results remain very much the same. However, one can see that a
t-test on the environmental policy preference variable would reject its signiﬁcance at a 10%
level, but accept it at an 11% level. Using the unbalanced panel, we actually use all the
information available (9967 observations) and in that respect results are more reliable.
This mitigates the results obtained when we pooled individuals: we can not clearly reject
the negative eﬀect of environmental preferences, yet neither are we able to conclude that the
eﬀect is clearly signiﬁcant. However, this signiﬁcance seems to grow over time. The same
econometric analysis is performed in the following section, discriminating by type of central
heating.
2.4.4 Separating by type of energy
One problem that could be raised with this type of analysis is that the type of energy does
not play on the intercept term (as it does when using a dummy variable), but on the slope,
and that therefore the model is structurally diﬀerent. Therefore, it is worth performing the
analysis diﬀerentiating observations by type of energy use.
We will focus on gas and electricity users, because they represent 8999 observations among
9967 (gas:7772 observations and electricity: 1227). The results are shown in tables 3.4 3.5.
First, one can see that the general model is robust for the considered subsamples: the co-
eﬃcients are roughly the same in terms of both signiﬁcance and sign. Yet, there are some
diﬀerences in magnitude. What is more important for us is the sign and the signiﬁcance of
the coeﬃcient related to the variable accounting for environmental policy preferences. As
concerns households that use gas to heat their accommodation, the environmental policy
preferences are not signiﬁcant, be they pool or panel regressions, even though once again
the coeﬃcients are negative. On the contrary, the environmental policy preferences do have
a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on levels of energy spending. When undertaking pooled re-
gression, the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at a 1% level, while it is signiﬁcant at a 5% level when
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we perform a panel regression. This analysis may proceed a step further and try to regress
separately by waves. This has been undertaken for both, but given the number of observa-
tions, separating for electricity users only permits the analysis of small subsamples (about
400 hundreds per wave)8. Therefore the following focuses upon gas users. As concerns the
latter, one can see in the three last tables that the coeﬃcients of the environmental policy
preferences are always negative, though not signiﬁcant. However, we observe the same trend
as the one observed in the ﬁrst regressions: the signiﬁcance increases over time. As concerns
the ﬁrst wave, the t-stat is equal to −.35; in the second wave, it is equal to −0.55; in the last
wave, it is equal to −1.61, i.e. almost signiﬁcant at a 10% level. These latter results occur
with the result of the ﬁrst set fo analysis, where an increasing signiﬁcance of environmental
policy preferences was observed, yet they fail to conﬁrm the existence of an empirical cor-
relation between environmental policy preferences and energy consumption. Although the
coeﬃcient associated to the variable ”env”is always negative, it is not signiﬁcant.
To conclude, the empirical investigation undertaken here reveals no evidence of a robust
relationship between environmental policy preferences and energy consumption.
2.5 Conclusion
Finally, it is important to highlight how the conclusion from this empirical investigation
remains somehow ambiguous. On the one hand, the coeﬃcient related to the environmental
policy preferences is always negative. Moreover, there seems to be an increase of the eﬀect
over time. Finally, the eﬀect is observed signiﬁcantly at a general level (see ﬁrst results).
On the other hand, those results obtained when separating by wave and by type of energy,
clearly mitigate the previous results. This robustness check rather suggests that this eﬀect
of environmental preferences can not be generalised: therefore, the model not including the
8Actually, performing these regressions turned out not to be satisfactory: some coeﬃcients, because of
their signiﬁcance, their magnitude, or even their signs do not really make sense. Therefore no conclusion
may be drawn from them.
Meunier, Laurent (2008),Theoretical and Econometric Analysis of Behaviours Toward Environment
European University Institute
DOI: 10.2870/136544 CHAPTER 2. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY PREFERENCES VS BEHAVIOURS
environmental policy preferences seems to be closer to the ”truth”. However, this empirical
investigation deserves to be extended. Indeed, environmental values have spread a lot since
the early nineties and the same kind of econometric analysis might reveal what we failed to
reveal in that paper.
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Income and Energy Consumption
3.1 Introduction
Although the existence of environmental Kuznets curve has been subject to considerable
empirical investigation, there is still no clear evidence that proves the existence of such a
curve. According to the theory, one should observe a bell-shaped relationship between income
and environmental damage at the aggregate level; however, this seems not to be observed
empirically. At best, it is observed for some local pollutants. This means that either techno-
logical progress does not outweigh the growth human needs; or that the top of the bell has
yet not been reached. We will in the next section give more details about Environmental
Kuznet Curve theory.
Up to now, this existence has just been investigated at an aggregate (country) level, but it
has never been investigated at the micro level (households). It seems interesting to investi-
gate it at the individual level: indeed, if we do not observe it at the individual level, then
one can seriously wonder how it is be supposed to be observed at the aggregate level.
Therefore the purpose of this chapter is to interpret Environmental Kuznets Curve (hence-
forth EKC) theory at a disaggregated level and then to examine if empirical evidence sup-
porting such a theory is available. Both income and energy consumption still increase at the
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aggregate level in rich west European countries1. In particular, domestic energy consumption
increased by 19% in the UK, whereas the population increased by 4% from 1990 to 2004.
Given this problematic it is necessary to explore what occurs at the individual level: does
energy consumption just increase in relation to income or is there a threshold from which the
latter stabilises, or -even better for the environment- decreases? The main argument is that
there should be a threshold in our needs for heating, lighting and thus energy consuming. If
this is true, then we should observe a threshold of energy consumption from which individual
consumption stabilises. Furthermore, if technological progress has the eﬀects it is supposed
to have, then consumption actually decrease.
The chapter begins with a presentation of the EKC theory and the related empirical litera-
ture. Following this introduction it interprets it at the microeconomic level. Finally, using
panel data from the British Households Panel Survey, the empirical relevance of this theory
will be investigated.
3.2 Environmental Kuznets Curve Theory
3.2.1 Theoretical Foundations
This section will discuss the most important features of the Environmental Kuznets Curve
(from now, EKC).
At ﬁrst, Kuznets observed, at a country level, an inverted U-shaped relationship between
the level of per capita income and the level of income inequalities (see Kuznets, 1955). In
the early nineties the idea that this theory could be transposed to the level of income and
environmental externalities emerged. (see Grossman and Krueger (1991) and Shafik
and Bandyopadhyway (1992)).
The explanation of the observation of an inverse U-shaped relationship relates ot the fol-
lowing. For low levels of income, consequences of human activities are limited because the
economy is based on subsistence production. Indeed, the only need to be satisﬁed is mainly
1Their total energy consumption has increased by 8% between 1992 and 1999. Refer to the report of the
European Environment Agency, 2003
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to feed oneself. Therefore, the level of externality is low. Subsequently as agriculture and
industry develop, natural resources extraction and pollutants rejection together increase the
pressure on the environment. Switching from fruit gathering to agriculture enhances a clear
resource depletion. Then, the massive use of chemicals clearly contributes to reject and
spread pollutants in the soil, underground water and the atmosphere. Development of in-
dustry obviously entails the depletion of resources and above all the generation of pollutants.
That is why the level of environmental externality increases in line with increases in income.
However, as a population becomes richer, it can sacriﬁce an increasing part of its capital
to develop clean technologies and as a result obtains gains from technological progress. It
is for this reason that the level of externality still increases, but does so at a lower pace.
Eventually, the invested capital results in a degree of technological progress such that the
society aﬀected is able to increase its income, and reduce the level of externality. That is
why the curve is eventually down-sloped.
To understand better the eﬀects at stake, we will describe them in the next section.
Eﬀects at Stake
There are three main eﬀects on the production process that are of particular importance.
Firstly, there is a scale eﬀect: ceteris paribus the larger the production, the higher the
consumption of raw materials, natural and energetic resources, but also the higher the pol-
lution. In other words, for a given good, any increase in production will mechanically result
in an increase in the consumption of the resources that are needed to produce it. Moreover,
if a given number n of produced units generated a level l of pollutant, a number n0 > n of
produced unit will generate a level l0 > l of pollutants. The scale eﬀect is clear: it is positive
on the externality.
Secondly, there is a composition eﬀect, namely the fact that the shares of diﬀerent sectors
evolve. To understand the extent of this eﬀect, it is only necessary to take into consideration
the diﬀerences between developed countries and third-world countries concerning the share
of agriculture in their respective GDP. In other words, as they grow, economies switch from
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agriculture, to industry and eventually to services. Yet, the sense of this composition eﬀect
is ambiguous: even if an economy produces relatively less agricultural goods, it does not
mean that it produces less agricultural goods in absolute terms.
Last but not least, there is a technological progress eﬀect: as a country becomes richer,
it can invest more in R&D, in particular to develop clean technologies. This is an eﬀect that
is -ceteris paribus- clearly negative with respect to the level of externality. Clearly, we are
not considering any new technology, but only the ones that enhance decreases in environ-
mental damage. Indeed, for a given production, if we ﬁnd a new process that saves on
energy, or reduces CO2 emissions, the externality decreases and so does the pressure on the
environment.
Therefore, if the inverted U-shaped relationship between income and pollution exists, the
latter eﬀect must outweigh the ﬁrst one, or the two ﬁrst ones if the second is also positive
with respect to the level of externality. This summarises the core of the EKC theory: from
a given threshold of income (i.e. the top of the bell), technological progress will allow us to
produce increasingly more, though destroying the environment increasingly less. In front of
such a prediction2, many attempts have been performed to conﬁrm it or contest it. That is
what we will see in the next section.
3.2.2 Empirical Evidence
In the empirical literature, results do not seem to be consistent with the existence of a EKC.
One has to recall that the externality considered by EKC theory is a global index that
measures the total amount of environmental externality. The main conclusion that one can
draw from the empirical literature is that some evidence supporting the EKC has been pro-
vided, but only for some local pollutants. In Grossman and Krueger, 1994, the authors
estimated the EKC for diﬀerent types of pollutants. They used data of the GEMS3 and of
2Going further reasoning that way leads to an absurd result: either we would be able to produce an
inﬁnite amount of goods with a ﬁnite amount of resources; or we would be able to produce a ﬁnite amount
of goods from nothing...
3Global Environmental Monitoring System
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Summers and Heston (1991) for income which provided them with information on about
50 countries over a period of approximately 10 years. It is important to remember that as
this project was interested in some pollutants, it did not really test for the complete exis-
tence of an ECK, but rather had the more limited empirical goal of simply testing whether a
bell-shaped relationship between the level of one given pollutant and per-capita income ex-
ists. They regress several indexes which represent levels of a given environmental externality
(on both water and air) on a set of variables, among which income, its square and its cube
(to have some ﬂexibility in the estimation of the relationship). The coeﬃcient of interest is
the one associated to the squared income: ﬁnding a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient is a
condition to have a bell-shaped relationship between income and environmental externality.
It worked for SO2. The only conclusion that can be drawn from this work is that for some
pollutants, the relationship between income and the quantity of the pollutant is bell-shaped,
but in no way that the global pressure on the environment decreases. Moreover, their results
have been contested by Harbaug and al. (2000). They used an upgraded version (10
years more and 3 more countries) of the same database and did not ﬁnd the same results: the
bell-shaped relationship between income and level of SO2 in the air is not observed anymore.
Using data from 30 countries over 10 years from the World Resources Institute, Selden
and Song (1994) obtained some similar results to those of Grossman and Krueger for
some speciﬁc air pollutants. Shafik and Bandyopdhyay (1992) found the same kind of
results for SO2 on a sample of 149 countries for the period 1960-1990, but not as concerned
the CO2 and municipal waste: they both increase with respect to the level of income. De
Bruyn and al. (1998) even found only increasing monotone relationships between in-
come and some pollutants, and the composition of the sample is of crucial importance (see
Stern and Common, 2001). Grimes and Roberts found some empirical evidence that
the divergence between developing countries and industrialized countries explains more the
shape of the curve than a ”Kuznets eﬀect”.
Otherwise, Magnani (2000) shows that the intra-national income distribution matters:
when there are inequalities, the gap between the willingness-to-pay and the actual possibil-
ity to pay might enhance a decrease in R&D spending. Stern(2003) shows that developing
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countries address some environmental issues, and sometimes perform even better than richer
countries. Clearly, this does not conﬁrm the existence of an EKC.
In the end, the main conclusion that can be drawn from this empirical literature is that there
is no clear empirical evidence which conclusively supports the existence of a EKC. However,
desptite their diﬀerences what all of these empirical studies share in common is there focus
upon the aggregated level. In the next section of this chapter the focus is upon the individual
level.
3.3 Microeconomic Interpretation of EKC Theory
In this section, we will ﬁrst reinterpret the ECK at a microeconomic level and then look at
the ways to test its empirical relevance.
3.3.1 Theoretical Arguments
Why reinterpreting Kuznets’theory at the individual level?
At the origin of the paper and the reformulation of the EKC theory is the fact that the latter
is a macroeconomic theory and that it does not take into account the possible importance
of individual behaviours. This is the problem raised by any analysis based on aggregation.
One considers countries that have completely diﬀerent cultures, economic systems: the main
criterion of heterogeneity being the per-capita income. It is likely to be an important limita-
tion, and might be the reason for the absence of an empirically observable ECK. Moreover,
the timing in the ECK theory is vague: we do not know when the society -or country- will
achieve the top of the bell and then the virtuous path of ”sustainable growth”, if it exists4.
This is a problem because the theory can never really be tested empirically. Indeed, one can
always say that we do not observe it because no country has yet passed over the top of the
bell.
On the contrary, the notion of time is diﬀerent at the individual level: time is much shorter.
4Indeed, can something grow endlessly in a ﬁnite physical world? See Georgescu, 1971
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Indeed, we need to observe people for a couple of years to gather information upon all the
eﬀects which are at stake. This is particularly relevant as far as the technological progress is
concerned. Moreover, understanding the speciﬁcities of a given good might allow us to draw
conclusions in terms of economic policy. This motivation is really important if one looks
at the consumption of energy in the UK since the 70’s: it has just been increasing, which
raises some obvious political and in particular environmental issues. As already mentioned,
energy consumption accounts for a large part (about 30%) of the global footprint (mainly
because we use fossil fuels) and if we look at its evolution, one can see that it just increases
over time. In particular, the energy consumption for domestic needs5in the UK increased
by between 1970 and 2000. Even though British people exerted a massive eﬀort to improve
insulation, it has not prevented people from consuming more energy. The report of the DTI
”Energy Consumption in the UK”(2000) explains this increase by referring among other to
the profusion of electric appliances. This would go in the sense of the existence of a growing
path in energy consumption. Thus, we want to know what happens at the individual level.
The chapter now turns to present and describe the microeconomic interpretation of the ECK
theory.
Microeconomic eﬀects
We will describe the already mentioned three eﬀects at stake and reinterpret it at the mi-
croeconomic level.
• The scale-eﬀect
The basic idea is that as households become richer, their energy consumption increases
ceteris paribus. Indeed, becoming richer allows people to consume more and so do
they. In particular, they can heat more and thus consume more energy. They can
also have better lighting and more domestic appliances. They can ﬁnally have a larger
accommodation. This eﬀect is clearly positive vis-` a-vis energy consumption.
5Heating, lighting, cooking, etc...
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• The composition-eﬀect
As people get richer, there is a transformation of the bundle of goods they purchase:
the share of necessary goods is growing smaller and smaller because they will consume
an increasing number of comfort and superﬂuous goods. As far as energy consumption
is concerned, necessary goods would be lighting and heating (both air and water). Su-
perﬂuous goods can be any type of appliances that possibly makes life more comfortable
and that uses energy. A tumble dryer is a classical example. It is noteworthy that this
eﬀect is not as ambiguous as in the aggregated case: the bundle of energy-consuming
goods seems to transform because other goods are added in the bundle rather than
because of substitutions. Thus, this eﬀect is somehow related to the scale-eﬀect and
should go in the same sense.
• The Technological progress eﬀect
As they get richer, households become increasingly more able to buy environmental-
friendly goods which are usually more expensive. For example, they can buy less
polluting cars, or organic food. More interestingly for our purpose, they can insulate
better (e.g. double-gazing) their house and as a consequence they should consume less
energy. They can simply invest and install heating systems that consume less energy,
or even better, that use renewable energy. Insulating better and having more eﬃcient
system of heating will make households consume less energy.
Having described the eﬀects, the question to be answered now is the following: does the
technological progress eﬀect outweigh the ﬁrst two eﬀects? If the answer is yes, then we
should observe a bell-shaped relationship between the level of income and the level of energy
consumption. If we do not observe it, then the answer is no. Intuitively, there might be
a threshold from which one does not want to heat more and owes any possible appliance.
What we want to know is whether such a threshold exists, and if the consumption of energy
then decreases thanks to technological progress.
Having described both the motivations and the arguments of a reinterpretation of Kuznets’
theory at the microeconomic level, we will now explain how we will proceed to test its
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empirical relevance.
3.3.2 Testing its existence
Concerning energy consumption and its relationship with respect to the income, there are
three possible scenarios: it can ﬁrst increase, then reach a maximum and ﬁnally decrease;
alternatively, it can ﬁrst increase, then reach a maximum and stabilises; or the ﬁnal alterna-
tive, it may just increase.
Clearly, the scenario consistent with the above theoretical arguments is the ﬁrst one. We will
ﬁrst estimate the energy consumption of households, controlling for a broad range of physical
and socio-economic variables. In particular, we include income among the set of regressors ,
but also its square and eventually its cube to give more ﬂexibility to the functional form. Sev-
eral conditions are required to conclude that there actually exits a bell-shaped relationship
between income and energy consumption. The ﬁrst condition is to have a coeﬃcient of the
square of income that is negative and signiﬁcant. The second condition is that which occurs
when the level of income from which the energy consumption decreases makes sense, i.e. the
mass of people being richer than that level of income should represent a substantial part
of the sample. If not, then we will have to ﬁnd another functional form of the relationship
between income and energy consumption.
3.3.3 Data
The data used for the following analysis is drawn from the British Household Panel Survey.
It uses 8 waves, namely from wave 7 to wave 146. As seen in the previous chapter, this
survey is conducted yearly and gather information about social and economic variables. The
data we use concern about 2,500 households observed during 8 years. Concerning price
indexes, the dataset used the Retail Price Index of the Oﬃce of National Statistics. Note
that we have used one index for income and a diﬀerent index for energy spending. Finally, it
should be noted that the average annual growth rate has been computed since we have had
6From 1997 to 2004
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prices indexes of 1990, 2000 and 2004. From the Weatherbase data set, the regional average
monthly temperatures have been used. Additionally, the standard-error of these monthly
temperatures has been computde for each region.
3.3.4 Variables
In this section, a set of variables that we have to take into account in order to explain
the heterogeneity in energy consumption is deﬁned. Energy consumption is the measure
of a household’s footprint. The underlying idea is that, taking into account a broad range
of demographic variables, the higher the energy consumption of households, the less en-
vironmentally friendly they are. Implicitly, we assume that energy consumption enhances
environmental externality. We will regress the energy spendings of households on a set of
socio-economic and physical variables and then estimate the relationship between income
and energy consumption. We have taken into account a set of demographic, socio-economic
variables , and also some physical variables in order to comply as much as possible with the
theoretical determinants of energy consumption found for example in Redhanz (2005) or
see also Baker and Blundell (1989). We will describe them now.
Physical variables
The physical variables we use are the following ones:
• Temperatures
I have used the regional monthly average and its standard-error7. For each household,
we have the regional average temperature, and also the standard-error of the monthly
temperatures. It is clearly expected that the coeﬃcient associated with the ﬁrst should
be negative, and that of the second should be positive. Clearly, if the temperature is
too high, the relationship is inverted because of the possible use of air-conditioning.
7The information relative to the temperatures was found in http:
www.weatherbase.com
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This is one limitation of the analysis; however, given the location of the UK, this bias
might not be that important.
• Type of Accommodation
People living in ﬂat or terraced house are expected to heat less, thus the coeﬃcient of
this regressor should be negative. Our variable is equal to 1 if people live in a terrace
house or a ﬂat.
• Type of Central Heating
We construct dummy variables for each type of fuel (e.g. ”gas” is equal to 1 if the
household uses gas to heat its accommodation). Since this variable captures both
diﬀerences in prices among fuels and diﬀerences in eﬃciency among type of central
heating, signs of coeﬃcients are ambiguous.
Socio-economic variables
As concerns the socio-economic variables, the following variables have been taken into ac-
count:
• Income
This is the core of the chapter. Both the income and its square, but then also its cube
will be used as regressors. In an alternative speciﬁcation, we will use the log of the
income.
• Number of Children
Clearly, as this number increases, the fuel bill is expected to grow.
• Employment Status
We know whether the reference person (and its possible partner) is employed (i.e. does
not stay at home) or is a pensioner, unemployed or self-employed (and thus spend more
time at more). Our variable is a dummy equal to one if at least one of the partners is
not employed. We expect the sign of the coeﬃcient associated to it to be positive.
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• Renter vs Owner
Our variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the household does not rent its accommodation.
As renters might be less willing to invest in better insulation or system of heating and
landlords also may no invest in properties they view just as sources of rent income,
this might bias upwards the renters’ fuel bill.
• Rent includes some heating or lighting spendings
Concerning renters, whether or not some heating bills are included in the rent is a
crucial variable, since it controls for the ”hidden part” of the fuel consumption. This
is still a dummy equal to 1 if the rent includes some spending on heating.
• Environmental preferences
As the eﬀect is not clear (see previous chapter), the environmental policy preferences are
taken into account. The same variables are used as in the previous chapter. However,
as the information is not available for the waves we use here, we have taken the answer
given at the third wave of the second chapter. Implicitly, we assume that preferences
have not changed over time.
The Issue of Prices
Prices in general can vary in several dimensions: ﬁrst, prices vary in location; secondly, prices
vary in time; thirdly, in the case of energy consumption, prices vary by type of energy; ﬁnally,
prices can vary by type of contract.
It has already been shown that the type of energy ahs been controlled. Moreover, taking
into account temperatures allows us to control for the location. Indeed, recall that we use
regional temperature. Furthermore, we control for time by taking into account inﬂation. The
only thing we have to assume is that households are rational and choose the best contract.
In so doing, we control for variations in prices.
Notice that according to Hotelling theory on exhaustible resources (see Hotelling, 1935),
prices of energy are expected to grow exponentially. According to that theory, not taking
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into account this ”depletion”eﬀect on prices will lead us to overestimate energy consumption.
However, this hidden increase is price is not observable and therefore it is quite a diﬃcult
issue to settle. We are clearly aware that this might be a limitation of the robustness of our
results.
3.3.5 Model to be estimated
The dependent variable in our model is household energy spending. This variable takes
into account the expenditure of all types of energy for the house (i.e. heating, lighting
and domestic appliances using). Clearly, this is only one dimension of the total footprint
of a household. Ideally, we would like to have information on all types of consumption
and emissions. However, as already mentioned, energy accounts for a large part of one’s
ecological footprint. Energy spending is therefore a good proxy for the household’s ecological
footprint. The underlying idea of this analysis is that, taking into account economic and
physical variables, a household that uses more energy costs more in environmental terms.
Using GLS random-eﬀect estimator, we will estimate the following equation:
yi,t = βxi,t + α1inci,t + α2inc
2
i,t + ui,t (3.1)
Where:
• yi,t is energy spendings of household i at time t, in pounds
• xi,t is the set of socio-economic and physical variables of household i at time t, plus
yearly time dummies
• inci,t is the annual income of household i at time t, in pounds
• inc2
i,t is the squared annual income of household i at time t, in pounds
• ui is N(0,σ2) distributed
Issue of Endogeneity As mentioned in the second chapter, one could raise some con-
cerns due to the possible endogeneity problem. In particular, one could say that income and
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energy consumption are somehow jointly determined. Think for example of people having
more children: they will want to earn more and consume more energy. If that is true, the
consequences for our estimations would be dramatic as we know that estimates would be
biased. Yet, two objections can be made to respond to such a possible objection.
Firstly, I think that a causality relationship between income and energy consumption is likely
to be one sense directed: in our case, income determines consumption. A converse relation-
ship, i.e. energy determines income does not seem to exist to me. I believe that -at least
in a short run- people consume more because they have more income, rather than people
get more money because they want to consume more energy, although this could be true
within a couple of years. Secondly, we use a random individual eﬀect panel model and we
know that it is the best estimator if there is no correlation between residuals and regres-
sors. If not, estimates are not consistent and within estimator obtained using a ﬁxed eﬀect
panel model is to be used instead of the former one. Thanks to the Hausman speciﬁcation
test, we are able to know which model we should choose. In our case, we will see that the
test will allow us to accept H0, i.e. as there is no correlation between residuals and regressors.
3.4 Relationship between income and energy spend-
ings
We ﬁrst have run 4 panel regressions: two including the income and its square (see tables
8 and 9 in appendix 3: Panel I does not include environmental policy preferences, whereas
Panel II does); two others including both of the latter and the cube income(Panel III does not
include environmental policy preferences, whereas Panel IV does). This has been performed
in order to give more ﬂexibility to the relationship we wanted to determine and therefore
more robustness to the results. After having estimated the two models, we have determined
the estimated value of income for which the energy spending is maximum.
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Estimated Model Having a look at the tables of results (see annex 3), one can ﬁrst see
that the model of energy consumption used is a good one. First, a Hausman speciﬁcation
test conﬁrms the choice of random eﬀects rather ﬁxed-eﬀect model8. Moreover, there is
no nonsensical sign for any coeﬃcient, and most of them (apart from ”norent”) are highly
signiﬁcant. In addition, this is true taking or not environmental preferences into account
(which turned out to be signiﬁcantly and negatively linked to the energy consumption9).
It is noteworthy that when we include the cube income, both coeﬃcients related to the
square income and cube income turned out not to be signiﬁcant, regardless of whether the
environmental preferences are taken into account. The ﬁrst conclusion is therefore that the
ﬁrst functional form is better(when we do not include the cube income) than the second one
(when we do include it).
Relationship Income-Energy Consumption First of all, one can see that for all re-
gressions, the coeﬃcient of the square income is negative and signiﬁcant at a 1% level.
We will focus on the ﬁrst speciﬁcation since it turned out to be a better one. When we do
not take into account the environmental preferences, the estimated model is (panel I):




Therefore, the marginal eﬀect of income on energy spendings is:
∂y
∂inc
= .0022781 − 2 ∗ 5.17 ∗ 10
−9 ∗ inc (3.3)
Equalising it to 0 gives us the value of the level income -denoted t1- from which energy
spending decreases: t1 = 220,319 pounds. The number of observations above this value
represents about 0.061% of the total number of observations. When we include the environ-
mental policy preferences, the result is pretty much the same given that the threshold t2 we
obtain is: t2 = 220,532. At that point, it would be tempting not to accept the existence
of EKC; however, we should go one step further given the small number of observations we
8The statistic is equal to 0.28, which is far below χ2
(21) at a 5% level (equal to 41.40)
9This would go in the sense of the time eﬀect, suggesting consequently that people need time to translate
preferences into actions.
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have above the thresholds and therefore the huge uncertainty concerning any inference.
What we will do now is to try another functional form and see if the conﬁdence intervals are
smaller, i.e. estimation is better.
Instead of speciﬁcation (1), we will try the following one:
yi,t = βxi,t + α1log(inci,t) + ui,t (3.4)
Where:
• yi,t is energy spending of household i at time t, in pounds
• xi,t is the set of socio-economic and physical variables of household i at time t, plus
yearly time dummies
• inci,t is the annual income of household i at time t, in pounds
• ui is N(0,σ2) distributed
One can observe the implications of such a change in speciﬁcation: we assume that energy
spending monotonically increases with respect to income. The results of the estimated model
are given in table 9 (Panel V not including environmental preferences and Panel VI including
them). One can see that all the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant (apart from ”norent”) and with the
right sign. Both models seem rather good and what we can do now is to look at the conﬁdence
intervals of the relationship between income and energy spendings in the latter case and in
the case where income and its square is considered. Figure 1 shows the estimated values of
energy spending and the .95 conﬁdence interval: fs is the estimated energy spending with
the quadratic functional form (fsinf and fssup are the bounds of the conﬁdence interval);
fl is the estimated energy spending with the logarithmic functional form (flinf and flsup
are the bounds of the conﬁdence interval).
Figure 3
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Clearly, the second speciﬁcation is more precise than the ﬁrst one. This evidence would
rather contest the ECK theory. To conclude, a monotone increasing relationship between
income and energy spending seems to exist, rather than an inverted U-shaped relationship.
Last but not least, we have considered a good -i.e. energy- households pay a part of the
externality for. Indeed, they might want to decrease their energy consumption for economic
reasons among others. Moreover, we have taken into account the size of the accommodation,
which could have also been considered as part of the scale eﬀect. Thus, this was in a way the
most favourable case which could be found to look at the existence of EKC. Therefore, one
can be pessimistic concerning goods for which people do not pay any part of the externality
they create. However, the growing use of green energy might mitigate this result since it
might decrease the environmental impact of energy use.
If our results reject the existence of a bell-shaped relationship between income and energy
consumption, then there are two possible scenarios left: either the energy consumption just
increases with the level of income, the technological eﬀect not outweighing the scale scale-
eﬀect; alternatively, energy consumption stabilises after a certain threshold. If the latter
assertion is true, then we should not observe a big gap between energy consumption growth
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and population growth. However, since 1990, domestic energy consumption in the UK has
increased by 19%, whereas the population increase has been at 4% over the same period. This
suggests that the individual consumption increased, and that the former scenario is more
probable. This deserves to be investigated in order to better understand the relationship
between technological progress and energy consumption.
Measuring Technology Eﬀect
We will try a last speciﬁcation to understand better the possible time eﬀect at stake. To do
so, we will include in our set of regressors the average yearly income, and substitute time
dummies by a time trend. The coeﬃcients associated to these two variables will tell us more
about the pure income eﬀect on the one hand; any time eﬀect (like technology or preferences
changes) on the other hand. We will perform this estimation for both the model with the
income and its square, and then using the log of income. The results are shown in table A.10.
We notice that, for both models, the conclusion is the same: the coeﬃcient associated to
the income eﬀect, though negative, is not signiﬁcant even at a 10% level. Interestingly, this
would suggest that there is no income eﬀect in time. Relating these results to the previous
ones, we can say that income matters for a given year rather than between years: for a given
year rich people consume more energy than poor people. However, when household gets
richer, they do not necessarily consume more controlling for all the other variables.
The second conclusion that can be drawn is that there seems to be a downwards time
trend: as time runs out, households consume less energy. Indeed, the coeﬃcient in front
of the variable time trend is negative and signiﬁcant. Recall that this time trend measures
the eﬀect of changes in time, controlling for all the other variables. The fact that the
coeﬃcient associated to that variable is negative could be due to the existence of technological
eﬀect. Interestingly, this goes in the sense of the previous results. Indeed, we see that, after
having controlled for all the variables, an eﬀect of time on consumption exists. However, we
know that consumption has not decreased in the mean time. This means that the possible
technological eﬀect discussed previously is likely not to outweigh the scale eﬀect. As a
consequence, this second result goes as well as the ﬁrst clearly against the existence of an
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EKC at the microeconomic level.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated, we have investigated the existence of an EKC at the microe-
conomic level. To sum up, it began by posing the question whether possible technological
progress outweighed the scale eﬀect, i.e. the fact that richer households consume more energy
than less rich ones. Using data from the British Household Panel Survey, it has estimated
the relationship between income and energy consumption using panel data techniques. Two
results emerged from that investigation. Firstly, the relationship between income and con-
sumption seems not to be bell-shaped. Secondly, we identify a possible technology eﬀect,
that, even if it exists, is not strong enough to make energy consumption decrease with time.
These two results rather contest the existence of an EKC at the microeconomic level.
Meunier, Laurent (2008),Theoretical and Econometric Analysis of Behaviours Toward Environment
European University Institute
DOI: 10.2870/136564 CHAPTER 3. INCOME AND ENERGY CONSUMPTION
Meunier, Laurent (2008),Theoretical and Econometric Analysis of Behaviours Toward Environment
European University Institute
DOI: 10.2870/1365Conclusion
This thesis has centred on the interactions between economic agents and environment. The
main reason for having conducted a research related to these issues is the concern raised
by the increasingly evidence of the pressure exerted by humans on the planet. The latter
seems increasingly smaller and fragile, and I feel as I could not have conducted research not
related to environmental issues. The reason is that, as already mentioned in the general
introduction, economists deal with scarce resources issues and resources drawn from Earth
are becoming increasingly scarce. obvious examples includes high quality air or water, or
edible food. I mean that economic issues are necessarily related to an environment we draw
everything from.
First, the thesis has emphasized the possible conﬂict of interest at stake between competition
and environmental policy. This particularly true in highly polluting oligopolistic industries.
In such industries, it has been shown that competition objectives and environmental objec-
tives are antagonist. Notice at that point that it seems relevant to study the circumstances
under which competition is actually good for the environment. On the one hand, com-
petition leads to greater global production. On the other hand, it might stimulate more
environmental-friendly products.
The second chapter has investigated the empirical link between environmental policy pref-
erences and actions. However, it failed to ﬁnd a clear (expected) negative link between
those preferences and people’s actions. In other words, people declaring to be in favour of
the protection of environment do not signiﬁcantly consume less energy for domestic use.
Nevertheless, preferences are likely to change over time. This might be particularly true as
concerns environmental issues as humans will increasingly pay for the consequences of our
65




Finally, we have investigated the relationship between income and energy consumption in
order to conﬁrm or contest the existence of an ECK at a microeconomic level. The results
suggest that such an ECK does not exist. In my opinion, this result is not to be taken for
granted, but rather gives us a piece of the answer to a thrilling question: does technological
progress actually enhance less environmental damage?









Meunier, Laurent (2008),Theoretical and Econometric Analysis of Behaviours Toward Environment
European University Institute
DOI: 10.2870/1365.3. APPENDIX 2-RESULTS OF CHAPTER 2 69
.3 Appendix 2-Results of Chapter 2
Table 1: Variables
Variable deﬁnition
y dependent variable: log of monthly energy spendings
timea equal to 1 if observed in the ﬁrst wave
timec equal to 1 if observed in the third wave
env equal to 1 if people answers ”3”to question (A)
hgby year of birth of reference person
alo equal to 1 if at least one people (ref. pers. or his partner) is not employee
hsroom number of rooms in accommodation
nkids number of children
linc log of annual income
dd regional monthly average temperature
terf equal to one if accomodation is a ﬂat or a terraced-house
elec equal to one if household uses electricity to heat
solid equal to one if household uses solid fuel to heat
oil equal to one if household uses oil to heat
nap number of domestic appliances
renter equal to one if household rents
bilin equal to one if some spendings are included in rent
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Table 2: Pool and Panel Regressions
Variable Pool Bal.Panel Unb.Panel
timea -0.016 -0.046∗∗ -0.038∗∗
timec -0.012 -0.019∗∗ -0.026∗∗
env -0.024∗ -0.023† -0.015
hgby -0.001 0.001 -0.001
alo 0.085∗∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.058∗∗
hsroom 0.080∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.077∗∗
nkids 0.086∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.087∗∗
linc 0.059∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.042∗∗
dd -0.006∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.004∗∗
terf -0.016 -0.028† -0.022†
elec -0.154∗∗ -0.144∗∗ -0.155∗∗
solid -0.457∗∗ -0.445∗∗ -0.466∗∗
oil 0.142∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.162∗∗
nap 0.070∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.062∗∗
renter 0.132∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.089∗∗
bilin -0.175∗∗ -0.127∗ -0.124∗∗
Intercept 3.992∗∗ 1.210 3.873∗∗
N 9967 5700 9967
R2 0.3 . .
F (16,9950) 241.861 . .
χ2
(17) . 248695.198 2635.502
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 3: Separate Regressions
Variable Wave A Wave B Wave C
env -0.011 -0.024 -0.042∗
hgby 0.000 -0.001† -0.001
alo 0.106∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.080∗∗
hsroom 0.097∗∗ 0.078∗∗ 0.066∗∗
nkids 0.075∗∗ 0.076∗∗ 0.105∗∗
linc 0.050∗∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.074∗∗
dd -0.003† -0.008∗∗ -0.007∗∗
terf -0.008 0.005 -0.039†
elec -0.160∗∗ -0.140∗∗ -0.163∗∗
solid -0.522∗∗ -0.412∗∗ -0.394∗∗
oil 0.135∗∗ 0.171∗∗ 0.123∗∗
nap 0.065∗∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.071∗∗
renter 0.122∗∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.145∗∗
bilin -0.243∗∗ -0.176 -0.125∗
Intercept 2.068 5.364∗∗ 4.520∗∗
N 3409 3213 3345
R2 0.331 0.286 0.277
F (14,3394) 111.772 80.431 82.512
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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F (13,7758) 171.057 .
χ2
(13) . 1419.187
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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F (13,1213) 36.417 .
χ2
(13) . 374.97
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 6: Gas-Separate regressions
Variable Wave A Wave B Wave C
timea . . .
timec . . .
env 0.006 -0.010 -0.029
hgby 0.000 -0.001† -0.001
alo 0.116∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.058∗
hsroom 0.092∗∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.062∗∗
nkids 0.077∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.106∗∗
linc 0.054∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.078∗∗
dd -0.005∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.006∗∗
terf 0.004 0.009 -0.034
elec . . .
solid . . .
oil . . .
nap 0.068∗∗ 0.071∗∗ 0.067∗∗
renter 0.137∗∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.154∗∗
bilin -0.147 0.059 -0.092
Intercept 3.063∗ 5.516∗∗ 4.799∗∗
N 2572 2522 2678
R2 0.245 0.228 0.227
F (11,2560) 71.581 61.933 67.295
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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.4 Appendix 3: Results of Chapter 3
Table 7: Variables
Variable deﬁnition
y dependent variable: energy spendings, in pounds
time(i) equal to 1 if observed in the wave i
env equal to 1 if people answers ”3”to question (A) in wave 5
alo equal to 1 if at least one people (ref. pers. or his partner) is not employee
hsroom number of rooms in accommodation
nkids number of children
inc annual income, in pounds
inc2 square of inc
inc3 cube of inc
ndesi number of days of energy spendings
dd regional monthly average temperature
dds standard-error of monthly temperatures
terf equal to one if accomodation is a ﬂat or a terraced-house
elec equal to one if household uses electricity to heat
solid equal to one if household uses solid fuel to heat
oil equal to one if household uses oil to heat
norenter equal to one if household rents
bilin equal to one if some spendings are included in rent




Variable Panel I Panel II Panel III
inc 0.00228∗∗ 0.00232∗∗ 0.00326∗∗
inc2 -5.17*10−9∗∗ -5.26*10−9∗∗ -1.60*10−9∗
inc3 - - 2.04*10−14
linc - - -
ddm -3.37723∗∗ -3.34723∗∗ -3.37138∗∗
dds 15.86226∗ 15.96179∗ 16.05030∗
norent 1.39467 2.90201 -0.92909
alo 10.63870† 10.88424† 9.85600†
nkids 40.82555∗∗ 41.30856∗∗ 40.34521∗∗
ndesi 0.23600∗ 0.23738∗ 0.22729∗
hsroom 43.73784∗∗ 43.98467∗∗ 43.67492∗∗
terhouse -33.21205∗∗ -33.65999∗∗ 43.67492∗∗
ﬂat -60.62268∗∗ -60.20153∗∗ -59.88548∗∗
gas -19.77673 -20.35813 -19.66795
elec 7.60892 7.20818 8.17547
solid 113.06763∗∗ 112.67397∗∗ 113.94897∗∗
oil 173.25757∗∗ 173.85525∗∗ 173.91641∗∗
bilin -34.12828∗ -33.41217∗ -34.58742∗
env - -22.85772∗ -
tim1 50.70236∗∗ 50.73485∗∗ 49.58997∗∗
tim2 11.24429† 11.26331 10.72188†
tim3 -7.68706 -7.83136 -6.89089
tim5 -3.34263 -3.34698 -2.55506
tim6 -10.05157 -9.94465 -7.72339
tim7 -11.91419∗ -11.91315 -9.88056†
tim8 6.14706 6.19610 9.11544
Intercept 316.59986∗∗ 320.45260∗∗ 306.59396∗∗
N 16497 16497 16497
χ2
(k) 871.20648 877.7599 911.66564
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 9: Results
Variable Panel IV Panel V Panel VI
inc 0.00333∗∗ - -
inc2 -1.63*10−9∗ - -
inc3 2.09*10−14 - -
linc - 14.56786∗∗ 14.79433∗∗
ddm -3.33943∗∗ -3.44782∗∗ -3.42653∗∗
dds 16.16027∗ 15.75870∗ 15.83722∗
norent 0.61178 8.59445 9.84508
alo 10.09293† 12.97315∗ 13.19897∗
nkids 40.84132∗∗ 40.96891∗∗ 41.34651∗∗
ndesi 0.22850∗ 0.26514∗∗ 0.26672∗∗
hsroom 43.92827∗∗ 46.01392∗∗ 46.24821∗∗
terhouse -33.72618∗∗ -34.58985∗∗ -34.95234∗∗
ﬂat -59.42277∗∗ -60.98618∗∗ -60.66025∗∗
gas -20.27202 -19.63714 -20.08888
elec 7.77683 6.11680 5.77348
solid 113.56288∗∗ 111.01972∗∗ 110.67413∗∗
oil 174.56123∗∗ 175.28920∗∗ 175.78286∗∗
bilin -33.83811∗ -32.96272∗ -32.40010∗
env -24.13864∗ - -17.63277†
tim1 49.59546∗∗ 51.97102∗∗ 52.01576∗∗
tim2 10.72806† 12.06239∗ 12.09035∗
tim3 -7.02194 -8.07353 -8.19113
tim5 -2.53970 -2.26648 -2.25308
tim6 -7.55309 -9.07370 -8.96988
tim7 -9.82781 -11.33802† -11.32876†
tim8 9.24202 6.33918 6.38059
Intercept 310.44806∗∗ 198.29848∗∗ 199.33357∗∗
N 16497 16497 16497
χ2
(k) 917.10279 865.02281 871.2942
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 10: Trend and Average Income
























Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Meunier, Laurent (2008),Theoretical and Econometric Analysis of Behaviours Toward Environment
European University Institute
DOI: 10.2870/1365Bibliography
[1] P. Borkley and M. Glachant. Les accords n´ egocic´ es: une analyse de leur eﬃcacit´ e.
Cerna, 1999.
[2] R. Brau and C. Carraro. Voluntary approaches, market structure and competition.
FEEM , Documento di Lavoro, 1999.
[3] S.M De Bryun and al. Economic growth and emissions: reconsidering the empirical
basis of environmental kuznets curve. Ecological Economics, 1998.
[4] J. M. Buchanan. External diseconomies, corrective taxes and market structure. Amer-
ican Economic Review, 1969.
[5] C. Carraro and D. Siniscalco. Volontary agreements in environmental policy: a theo-
retical appraisal. Economic Policy for the Environment and Natural Resources, 1996.
[6] C. Carraro and A. Soubeyran. Environmental taxation, market share and proﬁts in
oligopoly. Environmental Policy and Market Structure, 1996.
[7] K. Conrad and J. Wang. The eﬀect of emission taxes and abatement subsidies on market
structure. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1993.
[8] M. David. Taxe environnementale et approche volontaire en oligopole de cournot. Crest,
Document de Travail, 2002.
[9] G. Dermot and H.G. Huntigton. The asymmetric eﬀect of changes in price and income
on energy and oil demand. Economic Research Reports, NYU, 2001.
79
Meunier, Laurent (2008),Theoretical and Econometric Analysis of Behaviours Toward Environment
European University Institute
DOI: 10.2870/136580 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[10] Q. Duroy. The determinants of environmental awareness and behavior. Journal of
Environment and Development, 2005.
[11] J.A. List E. Bulte, S. Gerking and A. de Zeew. The eﬀect of varying the causes of
environmental problems on stated wtp values: Evidence from of ﬁeld study. Tilburg
University, 2004.
[12] EEA. Europe’s environment: The third assessment. European Environmental Agency
Report, 2003.
[13] H. Folmer. Principles of Environmental and Resources Economics. Edward Elgar Pub-
lishing, 2000.
[14] R. Georgescu-Roeben. The Entropy and Economics Issues. 1971.
[15] M. Glachant. Les accords volontaires dans la politique environnementale: une mise en
persective de leur nature et leur eﬃcacit´ e. Economie et Pr´ evisions, 1995.
[16] M. Glachant. Voluntary aggreements under endogeneous legislative threats. FEEM,
Nota di Lavoro, 2003.
[17] W. Greene. Econometric Analysis, 6th Edition. Pearson Edition, 2003.
[18] R. Grimmes and Roberts J. Carbon intensity and economic development 1962-1991: a
brief exploration of the ekc. World Development, 1997.
[19] G. Grossman and A. Krueger. Economic growth and environment. NBER WP, 1994.
[20] L.G. Hansen. Environmental regulation through voluntary aggreements. Institute of
Local Government Studies-Denmark, 1996.
[21] H. Hotelling. The economics of exhaustible resource. Journal of Political Economics,
1931.
[22] A. Ichino. Micro-econometrics: Limited dependant variables and panel data. EUI,
Lecture notes, 2003.
Meunier, Laurent (2008),Theoretical and Econometric Analysis of Behaviours Toward Environment
European University Institute
DOI: 10.2870/1365BIBLIOGRAPHY 81
[23] Y. Katsoulacos and A. Xepapadeas. Environmental policy under oligopoly with endoge-
nous market structure. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1995.
[24] S. Kuznets. Economic growth and inequalities. American Economic Review, 1955.
[25] P. Sapienza L. Guiso and L. Zingales. Does culture aﬀect outcomes? CEPR, Discussion
Paper, 2006.
[26] T.P. Lyon and J.W. Maxwell. Self-regulation, taxation and public voluntary aggree-
ments. Journal of Public Economics, 2003.
[27] E. Magnani. The environmental kuznets curve, environmental protection policy and
income distribution. Ecological Economics, 2000.
[28] P. Manzini and M. Mariotti. A bargaining model of voluntary environmental aggree-
ments. 2000.
[29] D.G. McFetridge and E.S. Sartzetakis. Emissions permits trading and market structure.
Environmental Regulation and Market Power, 1999.
[30] P. Menanteau. Les accords n´ egocic´ es peuvent-ils remplacer les normes de performance
pour a transformation du march´ e de l’´ electrom´ enager? Cahier de Recherche n. 28,
Institut D’Economie Politique et de Politique de l’Energie, 2002.
[31] A. Meuni´ e. Controverses autour de la courbe environmentale de kuznets. Centre
d’Economie du d´ eveloppement de Bordeaux, Document de Travail, 2004.
[32] M. Motta. Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[33] R. Nadeau. The Wealth of Nature. 2003.
[34] OECD. Voluntary approaches: Two canadian cases. OECD Report, 2002.
[35] OECD. Voluntary approaches: Two united-sates cases. OECD Report, 2002.
[36] OECD. Environmental policy in the steel industry: using economic instruments. OECD
Report, 2003.
Meunier, Laurent (2008),Theoretical and Econometric Analysis of Behaviours Toward Environment
European University Institute
DOI: 10.2870/136582 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[37] OECD. Voluntary approaches: Two danish cases. OECD Report, 2003.
[38] UK Department of Trade and Industry. Energy consumption in the uk. Department of
Trade and Industry Report, 2001.
[39] R. Blundell P. Baker and J. Micklewright. Modelling household energy expenditures
using micro-data. The Economic Journal, 1989.
[40] J.W. McKean R. Hogg and Allen T. Craig. Introduction to Mathematical Statistics.
Pearson Edition, 2004.
[41] K. Rehdanz. Determinants of residential space heating expenditures in germany. Ham-
bourg University, WP, 2005.
[42] T. Selden and D. Song. Environmental quality and development: is there an eck for air
pollution? Journal of Environmental Economics and Managment, 1994.
[43] Shaﬁk and Bandayopadhyay. Economic development and environmental quality: Time
series and cross-country evidence. Background Paper for the World Development Report,
1992.
[44] D. Stern. Explaining changes in global sulfure emissions: an econometric decomposition.
Ecological Economics, 1996.
[45] I.D. Stern. The rise and fall of environmental kuznets curve. Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute, Working papers, 2003.
[46] I.D. Stern. Beyond the environmental kuznets curve: diﬀusion of sulfur-emissions abat-
ing technology. Journal of Environment and Development, 2005.
[47] J. Tirole. The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT Press, 1988.
[48] B. Torgler and M. Garcia-Vali˜ nas. The determinants of individuals’ attitudes towards
protecting the environment. WP, 2005.
[49] H. Vedder. Voluntary agreements and competition law. FEEM, working paper, 2000.
Meunier, Laurent (2008),Theoretical and Econometric Analysis of Behaviours Toward Environment
European University Institute
DOI: 10.2870/1365BIBLIOGRAPHY 83
[50] WWF. Living planet report 2006. WWF Report( http://www.wwf.org), 2006.
[51] Y. Zhihao. Environmental protection: A theory of direct and indirect competition for
political inﬂuence. Carleton University Economic Paper, 2003.
Meunier, Laurent (2008),Theoretical and Econometric Analysis of Behaviours Toward Environment
European University Institute
DOI: 10.2870/1365